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ABSTRACT
An employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is a 
deferred compensation program that qualifies under 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 401 to grant tax 
benefits to corporations and employees of corporations.
A corporation receives a tax benefit by transferring 
shares of its own stock to a tax exempt trust (ESOT) 
established for the benefit of its employees. The 
employees are not taxed until distributions from the 
trust are received, and taxation at that time is 
favorable.
Since ESOPs are related to tax incentives, the 
issue of tax policy has been raised. Advocates of ESOP 
tax incentives maintain that ESOPs benefit society by 
increasing business efficiency. This increased efficiency 
is a result of increased productivity of workers who are 
motivated by their participation in ESOPs.
The objective of this study was to provide ESOP 
policy makers with empirical evidence which would be use­
ful in the formulation of future ESOP policy. Specifi­
cally, the investigation attempted to reveal (A) whether
vii
any relationship exists between company operating per­
formance and ESOPs and (B) the nature of any relation­
ship which might be found to exist.
This investigation was carried out in three 
phases. First, an econometric model was formulated 
which could be used to test the general hypotheses of 
the study. Second.,-the data for the model were col­
lected through a questionnaire survey of 1136 potential 
ESOP companies. Third, the data were analyzed and the 
hypotheses were tested by statistically validating the 
model.
A multiple linear regression model was specified 
using company profit as the criterion variable and certain 
quantifiable characteristics of an ESOP as explanatory 
variables. Normalized versions of operating income and 
after-tax net income were used as profit measures to form 
two separate models when regressed against the common set 
of explanators. The analysis was cross-sectional in nature 
since the data collected on the questionnaires represented 
company activity for the year of 19 77.
Of the 1136 companies surveyed, 750 to 850 are 
estimated to actually be ESOP companies. A total of 16 5 
usable replies were received resulting in a response rate 






Total usable responses 165
The sample was partitioned into these subsets to make the 
analysis more useful. Thus, eight estimating equations 
were calculated using the least squares method. Equations 
were estimated for the pooled data and each of the three 
subsets in both of the models that were developed.
Statistically significant relationships were 
found only in the operating income model for the manu­
facturing company subset indicating a positive relationship 
between operating income and the ESOP for manufacturing 
companies. Further, the statistically significant variables 
in this overall relationship were percentage of company com­
mon stock owned by the ESOP and percentage of ESOP-covered 
employees who had vested interests in the plan which were 
both positively correlated to the criterion variable.
The results of the study support the general en­
couragement of ESOPs through tax policy. The results also 
indicate that ESOP policy makers should place greater 
emphasis on real transfers of ownership through ESOPs 





If we are ever going to curb the economic 
inflation which seems to bedevil us, we 
must find some way in which to encourage 
each man and woman to become more produc­
tive in his and her job. Providing each 
individual an ownership share in his 
employer, making him a partner with his 
employer in the profits which his labor 
generates, can provide us with an excel­
lent step in that direction.1
The above statement was made by Senator Russell 
B. Long in a Senate Finance Committee hearing on Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). The statement is repre­
sentative of the sentiment toward ESOPs of many influ­
ential members of the U.S. Congress.
An ESOP is a deferred compensation program which 
qualifies under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to grant 
tax benefits to both corporations and employees of cor­
porations. Since 19 74 many U.S. business firms have
1U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans and General Stock Owner­
ship Trusts, Hearings on S. 3241, S’! 3223 and H.R. 13 882 , 
9 5th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1978 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 58.
1
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adopted ESOPs and the business literature has presented a 
great number of articles on this subject. The American 
experience with ESOPs has raised many issues that cut 
across several disciplines. This study attempts to pro­
vide empirical evidence which can be used by the policy 
makers who will decide whether or not ESOPs are to become 
an integral part of the American way of life.
ESOPs in General
ESOPs generally involve corporate contributions 
to an exempt trust and subsequent distributions from the 
trust to the covered employees (participants). Since the 
tax exempt status of the trust is critical to the success­
ful operation of an ESOP, the term ESOT (employee stock 
ownership trust) is often used in reference to these plans.
In order to obtain the tax exempt status of the
trust and other tax benefits, an employee benefit plan
must be qualified under the appropriate provisions of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19 74
(ERISA)2 and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). To be
qualified, a plan must be established pursuant to a
written instrument. This plan document must contain
all the details of the plan.3 These details must, of
course, comply with the various provisions of ERISA and 
and the IRC which apply to the type of plan involved.
2Pub. L. No. 9 3-40 6, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
3ERISA section 402.
3
All ESOPs, then, are generally subject to the 
many restrictions contained in title I of ERISA and 
subchapter D of the IRC that apply to qualified plans.
One of these restrictions prohibits a plan from holding 
more than 10% of its trust assets in employer securities.1* 
However, ESOPs as well as profit sharing plans and money 
purchase pension plans are specifically exempted from this 
restriction.5 Such plans are referred to as "eligible 
individual account plans" in ERISA.6 These plans are 
permitted to invest up to 100% of their trust fund assets 
in employer securities. Other restrictions which apply 
to qualified plans relate to participation, vesting, 
nondiversion of assets, forfeitures, funding, and 
fiduciary responsibilities. A thorough discussion of 
these rules is beyond the scope of this study.
As qualified plans in general and eligible indi­
vidual account plans in particular, all ESOPs have the 
following common characteristics:





7Treas. Reg, sections 1.401-l(b)(1)(iii) and 
1.401-1(b)(2).
If
2. Corporate contributions to the trust result
in deductions or credits depending on the type of ESOP,8
These contributions are generally in the form of employer
stock or cash to be used to acquire employer stock.
The deduction or credit, then, is based on the value of
#
the stock.9 This aspect of ESOPs requires that closely- 
held stock be valued "in good faith by the trustee or 
the named fiduciary."10
3. The contributions, even though deductible
by the corporation, are not taxed as income to the trust 
or the participants.11
4. Income earned by the trust assets is not 
taxed to the trust or the participants.12
5. Distributions to the participants are gen­
erally made in lump-sum form and thus qualify for favor­
able tax treatment. A distributee may elect to have 
the taxable portion of a lump-sum distribution taxed 
separately using a ten-year averaging formula. Under 
this- election, the taxable portion of the distribution 
which applies to pre-19 7 3 participation is taxed as a 
long-term capital gain unless the distributee further
8IRC section 404(a) or IRC section 46(a)(2).
9 U.S. v. General Shoe Corp, 282 F.2d 9(6th Cir.1960).
1°ERISA section 3(18).
11IRC sections 401(a), 402(a)(1) and 501(a).
12Ibid.
elects to use the ten-year averaging formula for the 
full amount.13
There are, however, three distinctly different 
forms of ESOPs. This report will refer to these forms 
separately as A) stock bonus plans, B) leveraged ESOPs 
and C) investment credit ESOPs.
Throughout this report the term "ESOP’' is used 
in a general sense to refer to all three types of ESOPs 
where no distinction is necessary. Where a distinction 
is necessary, the above-mentioned terms will be used. 
Further, the term "ESOT" is used to refer specifically 
to the trust which is a necessary part of an ESOP.
Stock Bonus Plans
The stock bonus plan (SBP) is the simplest form 
of ESOP. SBPs are allowed a good deal of flexibility 
with respect to contributions. There are no ERISA or 
Code specifications as to the form of contributions or 
to the formula for determining the amount of contribu­
tions. Annual contributions are not required but contri 
butions must be "recurring and substantial."1* However, 
the IRC does put a limit on the maximum deduction which 
is available for contributions to an SBP in one year. 
This limit is generally 15% of covered compensation
13IRC section 402(a) and (e).
^Treas. Reg. section 1.401-l(b)(2).
although the limit is raised to 2 5% if the SBP is com­
bined with a money purchase pension plan. Carryforwards 
are available for annual contributions less than or 
greater than the 15% limit.15 Further, the contributions 
must be allocated to participant accounts according to 
a "definite predetermined formula."15
Flexibility is also permitted with respect to 
the trust fund investments. Although SBPs are permitted 
to invest up to 100% of their trust fund assets in em­
ployer securities, no minimum level of investment in 
employer securities is required. However, SBPs are 
required to make distributions only in the form of 
employer stock.17 This requirement, in effect, mandates 
investment of trust assets in employer stock at some 
point prior to distribution. The SBP may acquire the 
necessary employer stock from the sponsoring corporation 
or from another shareholder.10 However, an SBP is pro­
hibited from using an installment approach in acquiring 
stock.19 Further, since SBPs are qualified plans, the
15IRC sections 404(a) (3) (A) and 404(a)(7).
lGTreas. Reg. section 1.401-1(b)Cl)Cii).
17Treas. Reg. section 1.401,-l(b)Cl)(iii).
lsERISA section 4-08 Ce) and IRC section 4975(d) (13).
19ERISA section 406(a)(1)(B) and IRC section 
4975(c)(1)(B).
7
the trust assets must be managed prudently for the exclusive 
benefit of the participants.20
IRC Section 401(a)C22) requires SBPs holding more 
than 10% of trust assets in employer securities to pass­
through voting rights to the participants. If the spon­
soring corporation is publicly held, complete voting 
rights must be passed through. If the sponsoring cor­
poration is closely held, pass-through of voting rights 
is required only with respect to corporate actions that 
require the approval of more than a majority of share­
holders. However, as noted above, an SBP is not required 
to invest in voting stock.
Leveraged ESOPs
A leveraged ESOP results when an ESOT obtains a 
bank loan which is guaranteed by the sponsoring corpora­
tion and uses the proceeds to purchase stock from the 
sponsoring corporation. As part of the loan agreement 
the corporation is committed to make annual cash con­
tributions to the trust sufficient to amortize the loan. 
Generally, an ESOT is prohibited from obtaining a loan 
that is guaranteed by the sponsoring corporation,21 and 
it is unlikely that a bank would make a loan to an ESOT 
absent such guarantee. However, ERISA included an
2“ERISA section 404(a)(1).
21 See note 19.
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exception to this prohibition for leveraged ESOPs. This
exemption also enables a leveraged ESOP to engage in an
installment purchase of employer stock.22
IRC Section 4975(e)(7) defines a leveraged ESOP
as a defined contribution plan:
(A) which is a stock bonus plan which is 
qualified, or a stock bonus plan and a money 
purchase plan both of which are qualified 
under section 401(a), and which are designed 
to invest primarily in qualifying employer 
securities; and (B) which is otherwise 
defined in regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary.2 3
Leveraged ESOPs are, therefore, generally sub­
ject to the same tax rules as SBPs. In addition, IRC 
section 4975(e)(7) (through IRC section 409A) permits 
leveraged ESOPs to distribute cash subject to a partici­
pant's right to demand employer securities. The proposed 
Technical Corrections Act of 1979 will change the effective 
date of this provision to apply to distributions made after 
December 31 , 1979. 2 4 IRC.section 4975(e)(7) (through IRC 
section 409A) also requires closely-held corporations to 
grant leveraged ESOP participants the right to sell any 
distributed stock back to the corporation under a fair 
valuation formula.
22ERISA section 408(b)(3) and IRC section 
4975(d)(3).
2 3A similar definition is contained in ERISA 
section 407(d)(6). The term "individual account plan" 
appears in ERISA in lieu of "defined contribution plan."
21,H.R. 2797 and S. 614, 96th Cong., 1st sess.,
section 101(a)(5)(B).
9
The Technical Corrections Act of 1979 will also 
conform the section 4-9 75 definition of "qualifying employer 
securities" to the definition that is given to the term 
"employer securities" in section 409A(1) which applies 
to investment credit ESOPs.25 The definition in section 
40 9AC1) essentially limits qualifying employer securities 
to common stock or preferred stock that is convertible at 
a reasonable price.
Investment Credit ESOPs
Investment credit ESOPs were created as a tem­
porary program by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.26 
These plans, therefore, are often referred to as TRASOPs. 
However, the Revenue Act of 19 7 8 incorporated most of the 
TRASOP provisions of the Tax Reducation Act of 19 75 into 
the IRC by adding new section 409A.2 7 Although these 
plans now have a 19 8 3 expiration date, they have apparently 
become a permanent part of the IRC.20 Also, these plans 
are officially referred to as "ESOPs" in the IRC as dis­
tinguished from the term "leveraged ESOPs" which is now 
the term used in IRC section 49 75. This report uses the 
term "investment credit ESOPs" to avoid confusion.
25Proposed Act, section 101(a)(5)(C)
2 ePub. L. No. 94-12 , 89 Stat. 26 (1975).
27Pub. L. No. 95-600, section 141(a).
20IRC section 46(a)(2)(E).
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Pursuant to an investment credit ESOP, a corpora­
tion is allowed a tax credit of 1% in addition to the 
regular 10% investment tax credit permitted by IRC sections 
38, 46 et seq. That is, the corporation is allowed 
up to 11% of its investment in qualified property as a 
credit against its tax liability instead of the regular 
10%. To obtain this additional tax credit the corporation 
must transfer stock with an aggregate value equal to the 
additional credit to an ESOT.29 Another credit of up to 
1/2% is allowed if the corporation contributes stock equal 
in value to this extra credit and the employees also con­
tribute cash equal to this extra credit.30 Thus, the 
additional ESOP investment tax credit can total 1 1/2% 
of the investment in qualified property.
Investment credit ESOPs are generally subject to 
the same rules which apply to SBPs. In addition, contri­
butions must be made in the form of "employer securities" 
which, as mentioned above, means common stock or conver­
tible preferred.31 However, contributions car. be in the ■ 
form of cash if such cash is used to purchase employer
securities within 30 days of the contribution.32 Like
leveraged ESOPs, investment credit ESOPs can distribute





cash subject to a participant's right to demand stock and, 
in the case of closely-held stock, put options must be 
granted under a fair valuation formula.3 3
Investment credit ESOPs also have certain other 
unique characteristics. First, contributions to a plan 
must be allocated to participant accounts for the plan 
year the additional credit is taken in proportion to 
participant compensation. However, compensation in 
excess of $100 ,000 is disregarded.31* Second, partici­
pants must have nonforfeitable rights to any stock al­
located to their accounts.35 Third, allocated stock can­
not be distributed for seven years except in the case of 
separation from service, death, or disability.36 
Finally, a corporation may reduce its contributions to 
the plan as a partial reimbursement for the costs of 
establishing and administering the plan. As reimbursement 
for establishing the plan, the corporation may reduce its 
contribution (for the year of plan establishment) by the 
amount of the establishment costs not to exceed the sum of
A) 10% of the first $100,000 of required contributions, and







As reimbursement for annual administrative expenses, the 
corporation may reduce its annual contribution by the 
lesser of:
(A) the sum of
(i) 10 percent of the first $100,000 of 
the dividends paid to the plan with 
respect to stock of the employer during 
the plan year ending with or within the 
employer's taxable year, and Cii) 5 per­
cent of the amount of such dividends in 
excess of $100,000 or
(B) $100,000.38
Historical Development of ESOPs
Metzger traces the ESOP concept back to the 184-0 
to 18 50 period in Germany. Johann Heinrich Von Thunen 
used the ESOP approach in his farming business. Metzger 
states that the profits of the business were reinvested 
in capital assets that were titled to the workers. He 
further states that the program included the maintenance 
of individual employee accounts that were credited annually 
with shares of the profit.39
Although various forms of employee participation 
have been used in the U.S. and Europe for many years, the 
ESOP approach was quite limited until 19714. In that year 
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act. ERISA, sometimes referred to as the Pension Reform
38IRC section 409A(i)(2).
"Submission by Bert L. Metzger, President, Profit 
Sharing Research Foundation, Hearings, 197 8, p. 531.
.13
Act of 1974, essentially tightened the rules for adminis­
tering private pension plans. ERISA has apparently 
promoted ESOPs in two ways. First, the Act permits only 
leveraged ESOPs to engage in the leveraging procedure 
described above. This provision of ERISA is generally 
traced to Senator Russell Long who got the idea of 
leveraged ESOPs from Louis 0. Kelso.1*0 Kelso is generally 
considered to be the originator of the ESOP concept al­
though his theories seem to be limited to the use of 
leveraged ESOPs as capital formation vehicles.1*1 The 
second way that ERISA promoted ESOPs is less direct.
ERISA contains harsh penalties for imprudent management 
of pension fund assets. Since ESOPs are permitted to 
invest primarily in employer securities, diversifica­
tion of trust fund assets is not required. ERISA, 
therefore, may have encouraged ESOPs and simultaneously 
discouraged traditional pension plans. Since vast numbers 
of traditional pension plans have been discontinued since 
197 4, there is a possibility that ESOPs are being used 
as substitutes or replacements for traditional plans.1*2
110Charles G. Burck, "There's More to ESOP than 
Meets the Eye," Fortune, March 1976, p. 129.
1,1 See Louis 0. Kelso and Patricia Hetter, How to 
Turn Eighty Million Workers into Capitalists (New York: 
Random House, 19 6 71}..
1,2"One-Third of Pension Plans Die," The Morning 
Advocate (Baton Rouge, LA.), 21 July 1977, p. G8.
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The Tax Reducation Act of 19 75 also promoted ESOP forma­
tion. As mentioned above, this law created the invest­
ment credit ESOP,
Since 19 74 there have been several other ESOP 
provisions injected into the tax law. However, in the 
evolution of ESOPs, ERISA and the Tax Reduction Act of 
19 7 5 were unquestionably the critical events. Table 1 
below illustrates the pattern of ESOP formation apparently 
flowing from this legislation.
TABLE 1 
PATTERN OF ESOP FORMATION
Estimated Number of 
Period New Plans Established
1955 - 1970 300
1970 - 1976 100
1976 856
1977 988
Source: Address delivered by Robert W. Smiley, Jr. to the
first annual meeting of the ESOP Council of 
America in Los Angeles, California, May 8, 1978.
The Need for Research
ESOPs and Tax Policy
The above discussion indicates that ESOP formation 
depends, to some extent, on tax incentives. The subject
4
of tax incentives is controversial on two levels. First,
15
there is disagreement on whether the government should 
use tax incentives in general. Second, among those who 
feel that the use of tax incentives is appropriate, there 
is much disagreement over which tax incentives are 
justifiable.
On the first level of the tax incentive contro­
versy, there seem to be two schools of thought. Many 
tax policy commentators feel that the income tax should 
be neutral. That is, the government should not attempt 
to influence economic behavior with the use of tax de­
ductions and credits. Proponents of the neutral approach 
to taxation believe that economic behavior should be in­
fluenced only by free market forces. When these forces 
do not result in optimality, then other nontax fiscal 
instruments or regulatory devices should be used to cor­
rect the imperfection. The other school of thought in 
this controversy takes an optimization approach to tax 
policy. Proponents of this approach emphasize the dif­
ficulty of achieving economic efficiency in a power-based 
economy. This group believes that the government should 
use all the devices at its disposal in attempting to 
correct the imperfections of the market system. 3
Tax policy with respect to ESOPs clearly falls 
into the second level of the tax incentive controversy.
“3George F. Break and Joseph A. Peckman, Federal Tax 
Reform, the Impossible Dream? (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1975 ), p. 8.
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Assuming an optimization approach to taxation, tax bene­
fits for ESOPs should be justified economically. Tax 
benefits in the form of deductions and credits are equi­
valent to direct government expenditures. The term "tax 
expenditures" is generally used to describe these special 
tax provisions which actually reduce tax revenues. 44 
Smith states that " . . .  the good effects of wise govern­
ment expenditures should more than offset the bad effects 
of the taxation which pays for the outlays."45 The good 
effects that may result from a tax expenditure are re­
ferred to as "external benefits."46 To justify a tax 
expenditure, then, the benefits flowing therefrom must 
reach beyond the group that receives the tax deduction 
or credit. A justifiable tax expenditure must produce 
external benefits for society at large.
After the enactment of ERISA, the ESOP concept 
burst onto the American business scene as a new and power­
ful tool of corporate finance.47 In those early ESOP days 
(1975*-76) the tax incentives necessary to encourage the
44Joseph A. Peckman, Federal Tax Policy, 3rd ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 25.
4SDan Throop Smith, Federal Tax Reform, the Issues 
and a Program (New York: McGraw-Hill; 1961), p. 3"!
46Robert H. Haveman, The Economics of the Public 
Sector, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 19 76)
p. 33.
47See Thomas L. Dana, "Mighty Kelso, His Brain Child 
is an Idea Whose Time Has Come," Barron's, July 21, 19J5, 
p. 3.
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adoption of ESOPs were related to the capital formation
problem. That is, leveraged ESOPs were touted as a low-
cost means for corporations to raise capital:
. . .(T)he difference between this and con­
ventional finance is that when a particular 
financing process is completed, the employees 
have bought stock, paid for it out of what 
the underlying capital produced, in pretax 
dollars which accelerates the process be­
cause the law permits this to be done, and 
the corporation has gotten the advantage 
of low-cost capital. . ,(I)t has very 
strong implications for monetary reform 
and the acceleration of the ability of 
the economy to raise newly formed capital—  
one of the most serious problems facing 
our country today (emphasis added).1*0
Clearly, capital formation is contemplated as an external 
benefit by Kelso in the above quote. Further, he appar­
ently ties this result to the assumption that a leveraged 
ESOP permits a corporation to raise low-cost capital. How­
ever, as revealed in Chapter III, this low-cost capital 
assumption has not held up well under subsequent analyses.
In more recent days, ESOP advocates have emphasized 
another aspect of ESOPs as justification for further tax 
incentives. ESOPs are also seen as a mechanism which can 
increase corporate profits by increasing worker producti­
vity. The following quotes are descriptive of this per­
ceived connection between ESOPs and corporate profits:
u8Statement by Louis 0. Kelso, Kelso and Co., U.S. 
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Employee Stock Owner­
ship Plans (ESOPs), Hearings, 9 4th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1§ 7 5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1976), pp. 132-135.
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. . .(I)f employees have a piece of the
action, one would expect that they would 
perform more responsively and more pro­
ductively. . . The employees would have 
a mutual interest with the employer in 
increasing the productivity and profit­
ability of the firm.1*9
In terms of employee motivation, our 
productivity increased very, very sub­
stantially in all areas of our company 
. . . From a financial point of view, 
our employee stock ownership has been 
a resounding success . . .  We have had 
3 profitable years after a series of 
unsatisfactory years . . .so
(Senator Long speaking) Mr. Strickland 
will you give us your thoughts about 
employee motivation as it results from 
employee stock ownership? (Mr. Strick­
land responding) Yes, Mr. Chairman. I 
could talk for a long time about that 
. . . In terms of net profit before tax, 
per employee, the five leading retailers 
ranged from $1,00 0 per employee to about 
$3,50 0 per employee. Lowe’s last year 
was $8,800 net profit, before tax, per 
employee. We think that speaks well for 
their desire and their drive.51
The external benefits flowing from ESOP tax incentives
according to the employee motivation view of ESOPs are
related to overall industrial efficiency resulting from
increased labor productivity.
H9 Statement by Donald Lubick, Deputy Assistant Secre­tary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, Hearings, 19 78, p. 170.
50Statement by J. R. Boulis, Chairman and President,
South Bend Lathe Company, Hearings, 1978, pp. 94, 95.
5 Statement by Robert L. Strickland, Lowe's Cos.,
Inc., Hearings, 1978, p. 74.
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ESOPs and Management Policy
The theory that ESOPs motivate workers is also of 
interest to corporate management. If this theory is valid, 
ESOPs would generate external benefits as explained above. 
However, management is interested in the internal benefit 
of increased profit. Therefore, if ESOPs can be justified 
on the basis of increased labor productivity for tax 
policy, the same justification would apply to management 
policy making. That is, any evidence which would support 
ESOP formation from the standpoint of tax policy would 
also support the concept of ESOP use as a management 
tool.
Related Research
Very little evidence is available to support the 
motivation theory of ESOPs. Two research projects were 
recently completed, however, which suggested the possi­
bility of further research on this theory. First, Conte 
and Tannenbaum studied the relationship between company 
profit and certain ESOP-related variables.52 Second, a 
group of MBA students at UCLA completed a survey which 
gathered information from companies with ESOPs.53
52Michael Conte and Arnold S. Tannenbaum, "Employee- 
Owned Companies: Is the Difference Measurable?" Monthly
Labor Review, July 1978, pp. 23-28.
S3Matthew Bonaccorsco, Sheridan Cranmer, David 
Greenhut, Daphne Hoffman and Niel Isbrandtsen, "Survey of 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Analysis and Evaluation
of Current Experience," (Unpublished report, UCLA, 1977).
2 0
Conte and Tannenbaum developed an econometric 
model designed to explain the relationship between pre­
tax profit and ESOPs. That is, pre-tax profit was the 
criterion variable and certain ESOP-related variables
were the explanatory variables in a cross-section
»
multiple linear regression model. The data for the model 
were gathered from firms with ESOPs. The analysis re­
vealed a statistically significant relationship between 
pre-tax profit and the percentage of equity owned by 
workers for the companies in the sample. The sample, 
however, included only twenty companies. Robert Strauss, 
former U.S. Special Counselor on Inflation, commented on 
this study by stating that " . . .  the sample is too small 
to be very definitive."54
The UCLA study was nonscientific in nature. That 
is, no hypotheses were tested. The purpose of the sur­
vey was to gather descriptive information about existing 
ESOPs and their sponsoring corporations. The most sig­
nificant aspect of this study was that the survey generated 
186 responses from ESOP companies. The researchers used, 
as their data source, a mailing list of potential ESOP 
companies compiled by the ESOP Council of America.
These two studies, then, are obvious complements 
to each other. Each one possesses what the other lacks.
s“Hearings, 1978, p. 165.
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The data source used by the UCLA group could be combined 
with the approach used by Conte and Tannenbaum to produce 
a study that would provide significant evidence relative 
to the fundamental effects of ESOPs. Such evidence, as 
indicated above, would be quite useful to both tax and 
management policy makers.
Scope of the Study
Obj ectives
As stated in the first section of the chapter, the 
primary purpose of this study is to provide the kind of 
empirical evidence described above. The findings of the 
study, then, will constitute evidence either for or 
against the claims of ESOP advocates relative to the im­
pact of ESOPs on company operating performance.
Methodology
The details of the research design used in the 
study are contained in Chapter IV. In general, however, 
the study combines the complementary aspects of the two 
studies described above. A modified version of the 
econometric model developed by Conte and Tannenbaum is 
employed. This study includes different variables and 
also partitions the sample into more homogeneous subsets. 
The sample consists of 16 5 companies that responded to a 
questionnaire survey which employed the data source of 
the UCLA study.
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The models developed in this study, as described 
in Chapter IV, are used to test the following hypotheses.
(1) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the ESOP-related 
variables.
(2) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the percentage of a 
company's stock owned by the ESOP.
(3) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the size of the con­
tribution that has been made to the 
ESOP.
(40 There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the period of time the 
ESOP has been in existence.
(5) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the percentage of ESOP- 
covered employees who have vested 
interests in the ESOP.
Organization of the Study 
This chapter as well as Chapters II and III review 
the ESOP literature relevant to the study. Some of the 
more important ESOP issues are examined in these chapters. 
The details of the empirical research are contained in 
Chapters IV and V, The research design and data collec­
tion are described in Chapter IV. The results of the data 
analysis and hypothesis tests are presented in Chapter V.
9Finally, Chapter VI contains the conclusions and recom­
mendations of the study.
CHAPTER II
ESOP ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss ESOP 
problems and issues relative to accounting and financial 
reporting. The impact of ESOPs on the balance sheet and 
income statement is discussed in terms of financial account­
ing theory and existing pronouncements. ESOP disclosure 
rules are discussed even though there are no specific pro­
nouncements in this area. Finally, the impact of the 
securities laws on various ESOP transactions is considered.
Balance Sheet Considerations
The ESOP Loan
The most serious issue in ESOP accounting is related 
to the leveraged ESOP. There is some controversy over 
whether or not the bank loan should be reported as a liabil­
ity on the balance sheet of the employer company. If the 
liability is not reported by the company, then the leveraged 
ESOP can be used as a means of off-balance sheet financing. 
Indeed this concept was probably the major selling point for 
ESOPs after the enactment of ERISA. Consider the following
23
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passage taken from one of the first articles to appear on 
ESOPs:
The ESOT technique introduces a new strategy: 
it encourages a firm to use an employee bene­
fit plan not only to help workers but also to 
accumulate new capital.
For example, say a company needs to raise $1 
million of capital. Under conventional fi­
nancing , it would borrow the money from a 
bank and receive a tax deduction solely on 
its interest payments, not on the principal.
Since it is re-paying the loan in after-tax 
dollars, to service the $1 million debt it 
must gross over $2 million. However, under 
the ESOT concept, the firm sets up an Employee 
Stock Ownership Trust, and issues $1 million 
worth of stock. The trust borrows the money 
from a bank (with the company acting as 
guarantor), buys the stock and hands over to 
the company the $1 million in cash.
Since the trust carries the loan as a liabi­
lity, the company has added $1 million to its 
net worth, which shows up as such on the 
balance sheet.1
A Statement of Position (SOP 76-3) issued by the 
AICPA Accounting Standards Executive Committee recommends 
that the ESOP loan be reported as a liability of the spon­
soring corporation.2 The same recommendation is contained 
in an SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB No. 8).3
However, theoretical arguments can be made for both 
sides of this issue. The case for not reporting the debt
xDana L. Thomas, "Mighty Kelso: His Brainchild 
is Idea Whose Time Has Come," Barron’s , July 21, 19 75, p. 3.
2"0fficial Releases," Journal of Accountancy,
March 1977, p. 10 2.
3CCH SEC Accounting Rules, par. 7001.
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on the balance sheet of the employer company is based on 
the definition of a liability while the opposing argument 
is based on the accounting doctrine of substance over form. 
These two opposing views will be evaluated in the following 
paragraphs.
The ESOP debt should not be reported on the employer
f
company balance sheat.if it does not satisfy the definition 
of a liability. Since the bank loan of the leveraged ESOP 
would, in almost all cases, be guaranteed by the employer 
company, the loan could be considered to be a contingent 
liability which may or may not be reported on the balance 
sheet.
The most authoritative definition of a liability 
is contained in APB Statement No. 4: "Liabilities --
economic obligations of an enterprise that are recognized 
and measured in conformity with generally accepted account­
ing principles."^ This definition is so vague, however, 
that it is of little use from a practical standpoint.
Other definitions of a liability which are con­
tained in respected sources of accounting literature are 
as follows:
1. An amount . . . payable in money, or in 
goods or services . , . particulary, 
any debt (a) due or past due (current 
liability), (b) due at a specified time
ÂPB Statement No. 4 . "Basic Concepts and Prin­
ciples Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enter­
prises," (New York: AICPA, 1970), par. 132.
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in the future (e.g., funded cost, 
accrued liability), or (c) due only 
on failure to perform a future act 
(deferred income, contingent 
liability).5
2. A liability is a service, valuable in 
money, which a proprietor is under 
existing legal (or equitable) duty to 
render a second person (or set of per­
sons) and which is not unconditionally 
an agreed set-off to its full amount 
against specific services of equal or 
greater money value due from this 
second person to the proprietor.6
3. The interests or equities of creditors 
(liabilities) are claims arising from 
past activities or events which, in the 
usual case, require for their satisfac­
tion the expenditure of corporate 
resources.7
The above definitions seem to provide considerable 
justification for considering the ESOP to be a contingent 
liability of the employer company. Hendriksen, in dis­
cussing the basic characteristics of liabilities, provides 
even more support for this approach:
The obligation must, of course, exist at the 
present time. That is, it must arise out of 
some past transaction or event. It may arise 
from the acquisition of goods or services,
5Eric L. Kohler, A Dictionary for Accountants,
4th ed., (Englewood Cliffs'] FT T7"i Prentice Hall, Inc,, 
1970) , p.- 263 .
6John B. Canning, The Economics of Accountancy,
(New York: Ronald Press CoV”, 1'9'2'Pj"" p p . 55-S6.
7AAA Committee on Accounting Concepts and Standards, 
Accounting and Reporting Standards for Corporate Financial 
Statements and Preceding Statements'" and SupjpTements ,
(Columbus, Ohio: AAA, 1957) , p . 77
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from losses already sustained for which the 
firm is liable, or from the expectation of- 
losses for which the firm has obligated 
itself. Obligations contingent upon future 
events should not be included unless there 
is a reasonable probability that these 
events will occur.0
If the bank loan of the ESOP is considered to be a
contingent liability of the employer company, then the com­
pany would not recognize a liability and related charge un­
less both of the following conditions are met:
a. Information available prior to issuance 
of the financial statements indicates 
that it is probable that an asset has 
been impaired or a liability had been 
incurred at the date of the financial
statements. It is implicit in this
condition that it must be probable that 
one or more future events will occur 
confirming the fact of the loss.
b. The amount of the loss can be reasonably 
estimated.9
So long as the ESOT is financially able to meet its obliga­
tions under the loan agreement, then, the employer corpora­
tion would not be required to report the loan as a liabi­
lity on its balance sheet.
The situation is reflexive, however, in that the 
financial capacity of the ESOT depends directly on the em­
ployer corporation itself. Therefore, the question of 
whether or not to recognize the liability would seem to
8Eldon S. Hendriksen, Accounting Theory, 3rd ed. 
(Homewood, 111. : Richard D. Irwin, IncT, 19 77) , p. >+51.
9Statement of Financial Accounting Standards Mo. 5 , 
"Accounting for Contingencies," (Stamford7 Conn.: FASB,
19 75), par. 8,
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relate to the financial health of the employer corporation. 
If the financial viability of the corporation is in doubt 
and if it appears that the corporation will not be able 
to meet its obligations, the ESOT loan should be recognized 
as a liability. Otherwise, the loan should simply be dis­
closed as a contingent liability.
The contrary position which is supported by SOP 
76-3 and SAB No. 8 emphasizes the economic substance of 
the arrangement rather than the legal form:
Financial accounting emphasizes the economic 
substance of events even though the legal 
form may differ from the economic substance 
and suggest different treatment.10
This view would report the bank loan as a liability
of the corporation. The assumption is that since there is,
in reality, no economic substance to the ESOT, the bank is
actually making the loan to the corporation. Consider,
for example, the following quote from a Big Eight partner:
. . . its the conclusion of most accountants 
that the debt, although legally one of the 
trust, should be regarded in substance as 
a debt of the corporation. Therefore, the 
apparent capital infusion will be treated as 
debt rather than equity.11
This view is further confirmed in a recent article 
by a bank president:
1 °APB Statement No. M-, par. 127.
11''Compensating Today's Executive— A Roundtable," 
The Arthur Young Journal, Winter/Spring 1976, p. 17 (Quote 
by Ernest” 0. Wood).
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The strength of a loan to an ESOP— ex­
cepting special conditions, government 
guarantees, etc.— rests on the strength 
of the company.12
SOP 76-3 and SAB No. 8 provide some guidance on this 
issue, but their questionable authority seems to leave open 
the possibility of alternative accounting approaches.
If the ESOP loan is recorded as a liability of the 
corporation, SOP 76-3 recommends that the related debit be 
reported as a reduction of stockholders’ equity.13 APB 
Opinion 25 requires the same treatment in recording the 
debit relating to the issuance of compensatory stock 
options.11* The recognition of an asset in either case 
could not be justified theoretically.
The liability could, theoretically, be reduced 
either (A) as the corporation makes its obligatory contri­
butions to the ESOT or (B) as the ESOT repays the loan. The 
first approach views the liability as a debt of the corpor­
ation to the ESOT. The second approach views the bank loan 
as being, in substance, a debt of the corporation. This 
latter approach is consistent with the substance over form 
view discussed above and is recommended by SOP 76-3.15
120. B. James, Jr., "ESOPs Revisited— Caveat Emptor," 
The Journal of Commercial Bank Lending, January 1977, p. 25.
13SOP 76-3, par. 7.
1 ■’APB Opinion 25, "Accounting for Stock Issued to
EmployeesT11 (New York: AICPA, 1972), par. 14-.
15S0P 76-3, par. 8.
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The related debit could also be reduced as in (A) 
or (B) above. The debit could be amortized in conjunc­
tion with the reduction of the liability. This approach 
recommended by SOP 76-3, views the debit strictly as a 
contra-account to the liability.16 Alternatively, the 
debit could be reduced as the ESOT-held shares are allo­
cated to participant accounts. This approach views the 
shares, constructively, as treasury stock until they are 
actually transferred to participant accounts.
Tax Allocation
Another balance sheet problem relates to the carry­
forward provisions that apply to employer contributions to 
an ESOP. Where a company makes a contribution that ex­
ceeds the 15% limit prescribed in the Code, the compensa­
tion expense reported on the income statement will ex­
ceed the deduction allowed on the tax return. This situa­
tion raises the question of interperiod tax allocation 
and the deferred tax liability.
If interperiod tax allocation is applied to this 
situation, the deferred tax liability would be reduced 
and a tax benefit would be recognized. The reason for 
this result is simply that the tax provision based on 
reported earnings would be less than the tax liability 
as determined by the tax return (assuming that there are
16Ibid.
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no other tax/accounting differences). If, on the other 
hand, tax allocation is not applied, then the deferred 
tax liability account is not affected and the tax bene­
fit is not recognized.
SOP 76-3 states that the tax effects of any timing 
differences should be reflected in accordance with APB 
Opinion No, 11. Paragraph 53 of that pronouncement states 
that:
The conclusions of this Opinion, including 
particularly the matters discussed in para­
graphs 42-50 on tax deductions resulting 
from operating losses, also apply to other 
unused deductions and credits for tax pur­
poses that may be carried backward or for­
ward in determining taxable income (for 
example, capital losses, contribution carry­
overs, and foreign tax credits).17
Accordingly, paragraph 4 5 states that:
. . . the Board has concluded that the tax
benefits of loss carry forwards should not 
be recognized until they are actually real­
ized, except in unusual circumstances when 
realization is assured beyond any reasonable 
doubt at the time the loss carry forwards' 
arxse; (emphasis in original)1
Apparently, tax allocation should not be applied to this
situation since it would be difficult to determine that
subsequent use of the contribution carryforward would be
assured beyond any reasonable doubt.
1?APB Opinion No. 11, "Accounting for Income Taxes," 





When a company makes a contribution to an ESOP it
is generally accounted for as compensation expense. This
treatment applies whether the contribution is in cash or
in stock. However, if the company contributes stock, the
value of the stock must be determined. If the stock is
closely held, valuation may be a problem.
In the case of publicly-held stock, APB Opinion
No. 2 5 states that:
. . . the unadjusted quoted market price of
a share of stock of the same class that trades 
freely in an established market should be used 
in measuring compensation.19
The Board, prior to making the above assertion, acknowledged 
the fact that the market quote is not always the best evi­
dence of the fair value of shares. Nonetheless, it con­
cluded that market quotes should be used for this purpose.
In cases where closely-held stock is contributed 
to an ESOP, the valuation problem is, of course, more dif­
ficult. Opinion 25 provides little guidance:
If a quoted market price is unavailable, the
best estimate of the market value of the stock
should be used.20
The best estimate for financial accounting purpo'ses, how­
ever, would apparently be the value which is determined for
19APB Opinion No. 25, par. 10(a). 
2 °Ibid.
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tax purposes. Criteria for valuing closely-held stock are
listed in Rev. Rul. 59-60 (1959-1 CB 237).
The above rules apply whether the company issues
new stock or treasury stock:
Measuring compensation by the cost to an 
employer corporation of reacquired (treasury) 
stock that is distributed through a stock 
option, purchase, or award plan is not 
acceptable practice.21
The Opinion does, however, make an exception where the
corporation:
(1) reacquires during the fiscal period for 
which the stock is to be awarded and
(2) awards shortly thereafter to employees 
for services during that period.22
If these two conditions apply, the cost of the treasury stock
may be used in determining the compensation expense.
In the case of a leveraged ESOP, compensation expense
relevant to the plan may not be based on the contribution.
Although SOP 76-3 recommends that the cash payment to the
ESOT be allocated between compensation expense and interest
expense, another approach is theoretically conceivable.
Strauss states that a . . more sophisticated approach
would be to measure compensation expense based on the fair




23Norman N. Strauss, "Accounting Considerations," in 
Employee Stock Onwership Plans: Problems and Potentials,
ed. Richard Reichler (Law Journal Press, 1978), p. 188.
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Earnings Per Share
In the case of a leveraged ESOP, there is some
question as to how the ESOP-acquired shares should be
*
handled for the purpose of computing earnings per share.
Hennessee and Giese suggest one approach as follows:
If the ESOP has no economic substance, and
if the ESOP debt is to be treated as a
liability of the corporation, then the 
conclusion that the shares held by the 
ESOP should be considered outstanding for 
purposes of computing earnings per share 
is materially inconsistent.2*
However, that approach would clearly violate the spirit if 
not the letter of APB Opinion No. 15. Although that Opinion 
does not deal specifically with this problem, the required 
treatment with respect to convertible bonds that qualify 
as common stock equivalents would seem to indicate that the 
shares should be considered outstanding for EPS purposes, 
furthermore, both SOP 76-3 and SAB No. 8 specify that such 
shares should be treated as outstanding stock for EPS pur­
poses .
Additional Investment Tax Credit
A final income statement problem relates to the 
investment credit ESOP. Accounting for the regular invest­
ment tax credit has, of course, been a controversial matter 
in financial accounting theory since the early 1960's.
21*Patrick A. Hennessee and J. W. Giese, "Accounting 
for Leveraged ESOPs: Employee Benefit or Financial Tool?,"
Management Accounting, June 1978, p. 46.
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The debate, for all practical purposes, ended in 1971 when 
Congress provided in Section 101(c) of the Revenue Act of 
1971 that corporations could use either the "deferred 
method" or the "flow-through method" of accounting for the 
credit. There is some question, however, whether this 
choice would also apply to the additional credit allowed 
for an ESOP. Since the additional credit is subject to 
the same IRC Sections as is the regular credit, it would, 
seemingly, also be subject to the same accounting treat­
ment. However, SOP 76-3 specifically states that only the 
flow-through method should be used in accounting for the 
additional credit.2 5
Disclosure
There are no disclosure requirements specifically 
applying to ESOPs to be found in the authoritative litera­
ture. APB Opinion No. 2 5 refers to paragraph 15 of ARB 
No. 43 for disclosure requirements which apply to the com­
pensation arrangements that are discussed in that Opinion.26 
However, paragraph 15 of ARB No. 43 applies to stock option 
and purchase plans:
In connection with financial statements, dis­
closure should be made as to the status of the 
option or plan at the end of the period of report, 
including the number of shares under option, 
the option price, and the number of shares as to which options were exercised during 
the period, disclosure should be made of the
25S0P 76-3, par. 14.
26APB Opinion No. 25, par. 19.
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number of shares involved and the option
price thereof.27
Information as to the status of the plan, number of shares 
under option, and number of shares exercised might pos­
sibly be applied to ESOPs. In the case of an ESOP, how­
ever, shares contributed to the plan in current and prior 
periods could be disclosed rather than shares under option 
and shares exercised.
Opinion 25 also refers to Regulation S-X for other 
disclosure requirements.2a These disclosures which apply 
to pension and retirement plans in general are as follows:
1. A brief description of the essential 
provisions of any employee pension or 
retirement plan and of the accounting 
and funding policies related thereto 
shall be given.
2. The estimated cost of the plan for each 
period for which an income statement is 
presented shall be stated.
3. The excess, if any, of the actuarially 
computed value of vested benefits over 
the total of the pension fund and any 
balance sheet pension accruals, less 
any pension prepayments or deferred 
charges, shall be given as of the most 
recent practicable date.
If a plan has not been fully funded or 
otherwise provided for, the estimated 
amount that would be necessary to fund 
or otherwise provide for the past ser­
vice cost of the plan shall be disclosed
27Accounting Research Bulletin No. U 3 , "Restatement 
and Revision of Accounting Research Bulletins," (New York: 
AICPA, 195 3), Ch.13, par. 15
28APB Opinion No. 25, par. 19.
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as of the date most recently deter­
mined .
5. A statement shall be given of the
nature and effect of significant 
matters affecting comparability 
of pension costs for any periods 
for which income statements are 
presented.29
Of the five requirements listed above, probably numbers
Cl) and (2) would be the only disclosures which would
apply to ESOPs.
APB Opinion No, 8 might represent another source 
for ESOP disclosure rules. That pronouncement lists the 
following disclosure requirements for defined benefit 
pension plans:
1. A statement that such plans exist, 
identifying or describing the employee 
groups covered.
2. A statement of the company's accounting 
and funding policies.
3. The provision for pension cost for the 
period.
4-. The excess, if any, of the actuarially 
computed value of vested benefits over 
the total of the pension fund and any 
balance sheet pension accruals, less 
any pension prepayments or deferred 
charges,
5. Nature and effect of significant matters
affecting comparability for all periods
presented, such as changes in accounting
methods (actuarial cost method, amortiza­
tion of past and prior service cost,
treatment of actuarial gains and losses,
etc.), changes in circumstances (actuarial
2 9CCH SEC Accounting Rules, par. 216
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assumptions, etc.), or adoption or amend­
ment of a plan.30
These requirements are obviously similar to those listed in
Reg. S-X and items Cl), (2), and (3) would seem to apply to
ESOPs.
Finally, Accounting Trends and Techniques contains
the following ESOP disclosure from the financial statements
of the Dennison Manufacturing Company:
Note H: Employee Stock Benefit Plans— In
19 75 and 19 75, the company adopted an Em­
ployee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and a 
Stock Savings Plan (SSP) to improve the 
company’s employee benefit plans by enabling 
most employees to acquire shares of the com­
pany' s Common Stock. The cost of the ESOP 
is borne by the company through annual con­
tributions to an Employee Stock Ownership - 
Trust in amounts determined by the Board 
of Directors. The SSP provides for employee 
and company contributions up to a specified 
amount.
Shares of Common Stock acquired by the plans 
are to be allocated to each employee and are 
held until the employee’s retirement or death. 
Contributions to the plans amounted to 
$1,169,000 in 1976.
At December 31, 19 76, the Employee Stock Owner­
ship Trust was indebted to the company in the 
amount of $5,027,000, which has been shown as 
a deduction from shareholders' equity in the 
consolidated balance sheet. In 19 76, the 
Trust acquired 242,325 shares of Common Stock 
held in the treasury for $5,2 02,000, the fair - 
market value on the date of sale.31
Based on the above information, the minimum financial 
statement disclosure with respect to an ESOP would seem to be
3°APB Opinion No. 8 , par. 4 6.
3lAICPA, Accounting Trends and' Techniques 1977, 
(New York: AICPA, 19 7 7), p. 216.
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as follows:
1. A description of the plan and employee 
groups covered.
2. A statement of accounting policies rele­
vant to the ESOP.
3. The value of and the number of shares
, contributed to the ESOP for each period 
for which an income statement is shown.
Securities Law
All of the major operations of an ESOP are poten­
tially subject to registration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). The Securities Act of 1933 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1931* require SEC regis­
tration in the case of any "offer to sell," "sale" or 
"delivery" of a "security." The provisions of these Acts 
may apply to the following ESOP transactions:
1. Creating an interest in the plan for a 
participant.
2. The transfer of stock: from the sponsoring 
corporation to the ESOT.
3. The distribution of stock to a partici­
pant.
The subsequent sale of ESOT-distributed 
stock by a participant.
5. The purchase by the ESOT of employee stock 
from a shareholder of the sponsoring cor­
poration.
SEC registration will be required for each of the 
above transactions unless the transaction is not within the 
scope of the Securities Acts or is subject to an exemption 
contained in the Acts.
M-0
Participant Interests in the Plan
A participant's interest in the plan may be a 
security under the 19 3 3 Act. Registration of the plan 
with the SEC is required unless the plan falls into one 
of the three categories discussed below.
(1) A specific exemption is available in section 
3(a)(2) of the 19 3 3 Act subject to three conditions. First, 
the ESOP trustee must be a bank. Second, the plan must be 
noncontributory. Third, the total amount invested in 
employer securities cannot exceed the total amount of 
employer contributions to the ESOT. This last condition 
might be a problem for a leveraged ESOP.
(2) A compulsory ESOP may be able to avoid the 
registration of participant interests by invoking the 
"no sale theory." That is, the creation of a participant 
interest in an ESOP does not constitute a "sale" of a 
security and is thus not within the scope of the Securities 
Acts. The no sale theory is supported in the case of a com­
pulsory ESOP because the participant makes no investment 
decision. Also, the no sale theory has been supported by 
the SEC.32
(3) The Daniel case offers a third possibility for
32Apparel Affiliates, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
August 15, 19 75; Trust Mortgage Corporation, SEC No-Action 
Letter, May 2, 1974; Upright, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
December 5, 1973; Consolidated Business Services, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, December 21, 1973.
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nonregistration of participant interests in an ESOP.33 In 
this case, the Supreme Court ruled that a participant's 
interest in a defined benefit pension plan was not a 
security under the Securities Acts. However, the decision 
did not apply to contributory plans and the application of 
the decision to defined contribution plans is uncertain.
Transfer of Stock From the Employer to the ESOT
The SEC staff has ruled that the no sale theory
3 4applies to employer contributions of stock to the ESOT. 
However, where the ESOT purchases stock from the employer, 
the no sale theory may not apply. In this case, two 
exemptions are possible under the 1933 Act. First, the 
sale may qualify under section 4(2) as a private place­
ment. This provision requires that the purchaser of the 
stock be in a position to obtain and understand any needed 
information on the issuer. Second, the sale may qualify 
under section 3(a)C11) of the Act as an intra-state issu­
ance. 3 5 To satisfy this provision the employer and the 
ESOT must reside in the same state.
3 3International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- 
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America et al. v^ Daniel, 
434 U. S. 1061 (1979).
3 *Harley Electronics, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
June 21, 1976.
35CBT Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter,
October 6, 19 75.
ESOT Distribution of Stock to a Participant
The no sale theory generally applies to ESOT dis­
tributions. 3 5 There are, however, two exceptions. First, 
the SEC staff has ruled,that a sale occurs when the par­
ticipant can elect to receive distributions in the form of 
either cash or securities.37 Second, a sale occurs when 
the distributed stock was purchased with' employee contribu­
tions. 3 8
Sale of Stock by a Participant
If distributed stock has been registered with the 
SEC, the participant is under no restrictions in disposing 
of his shares. However, if the stock has not been regis­
tered, it is restricted stock under SEC rule 144.39 When 
a participant receives restricted stock, he cannot sell it 
to anyone other than the ESOT for a period of two years. 
However, this holding period begins upon vesting of the 
stock.-0
36Monsanto Company, SEC No-Action Letter, September 
27, 1974; LTV Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, April 11, 1974; 
Upright, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, December 5, 1973.
37PNB Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, April 20,
1972.
38See note 35.
3 9 SEC Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. 230.144..
-“Unionamerica, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, August 25, 
1975; Snyder Crompten and Associates, SEC No-Action Letter, 
July 21, 1976.
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ESOT Purchase of Stock From Employer Shareholder
Section 4(1) of the 19 33 Act contains a registra­
tion exemption which would apply to shareholder sales to 
an ESOT providing the shareholder is not an officer, director
or major shareholder. A shareholder sale to an ESOT might*
also qualify as a private placement or an intrastate issue. 
Otherwise registration would be required.
Summary
In terms of financial accounting, ESOPs involve 
balance sheet, income statement and disclosure problems.
The balance sheet problems relate to reporting of the ESOP 
loan and tax allocation. The income statement problems 
relate to measurement of compensation expense and earnings 
per share and to accounting for the additional investment 
tax credit. Supplementary disclosures relevant to ESOPs 
must be determined by referring to pronouncements that 
pertain to other deferred compensation programs since the 
ESOP-related pronouncements do not provide guidance in 
this area.
In terms of securities law, all of the typical 
ESOP transactions have the potential of falling under the 
jurisdiction of the federal securities acts. To avoid SEC 
registration, an ESOP transaction must be effectively 
exempted from SEC regulation by definition or specifically 
exempted by statutory law. If an exemption is not avail­
able for a given ESOP transaction, SEC registration is 
required.
CHAPTER III
MANAGEMENT ASPECTS OF ESOPs 
Introduction
This chapter discusses ESOPs in terms of manage­
ment decision making. First, the financial effects of 
the various ESOP forms are analyzed. Second, the pos­
sible impact of an ESOP on organizational behavior is 
explored. Finally, ESOPs are compared to various al­
ternative employee benefit plans.
ESOP Financial Analysis 
There are many ways to analyze ESOPs in cost/ 
benefit terms. ESOPs involve costs and benefits to 
society in general, to the government, to corporations, 
to employees, etc. However, to evaluate ESOPs in terms 
of financial management at the corporate level, the 
focus must be on the existing shareholders. That is, 
the potential impact of an ESOP decision must be con­
sidered in terms of the welfare of the shareholder group 
in existence prior to the ESOP decision. This approach 
to corporate financial management is widely accepted as
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indicated by Weston and Brigham: " . . .  the operating
goal of the firm is to maximize the value of stock­
holders’ equity. 1,1
Financial Effects of ESOPs
The financial welfare of existing shareholders 
can be affected by an ESOP's impact on a corporation's 
cash flow, earnings, net assets and shares outstanding.
To determine the potential impact of an ESOP in specific 
quantitative terms, assumptions must be made about the 
behavior of these variables as well as other variables 
that would be affected by an ESOP decision. Since these 
assumptions would differ from firm to firm, a quantitative 
analysis in numerical terms is somewhat limited. The 
literature contains many of these numerical analyses and 
one of these will be referred to in the analysis below. 
However, this study presents a more general analysis of 
the financial effects of ESOPs which can be applied to 
any ESOP decision-making situation. The analysis shows 
the effects of an ESOP on a firm's cash flow, earnings, 
net assets and shares outstanding and is applied separately 
to each of the three basic ESOP forms.
*J. Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Essentials 
of Managerial Finance, 2nd ed., (New York: Holt, Rine-
hart'and Winston, Inc., 1971), p. 556.
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Stock Bonus Plans
When a firm adopts a stock bonus plan, shares of 
stock are contributed to the ESOT usually on an annual 
basis. These contributions result in the following 
favorable effects to the existing shareholders:
1. Cash flow is increased by the amount of the 
tax deduction which is equal to the fair market value 
(FMV) of the contributed shares.
2. The shares which are transferred to the trust 
give the employees an ownership interest in the firm which 
may motivate them to become more productive. This increase 
in worker productivity would increase earnings, net assets 
and cash flow.
3. The additional working capital may be reinvested 
in the business and may in turn generate additional earnings 
which will increase net assets and cash flow.
The adverse effects of a stock bonus plan to exist­
ing shareholders are as follows:
1. The additional compensation expense recorded 
when the shares are transferred to the ESOT decreases 
earnings and net assets.
2. The increase in shares oustanding decreases 
both earnings and net assets on a per share basis (dilution).
3. Any dividends paid on the ESOT-held shares will 
decrease cash flow and net assets.
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An analysis of the financial effects of a stock
bonus plan generally leads to the conclusion reached by
Hartman et al:
There is no difference between issuing stock 
to an ESOP and issuing stock to the public 
while making a cash contribution to an em­
ployee fund.2
However* as revealed in the above analysis, a difference 
in the two alternatives may exist if the ESOP motivates 
workers to become more productive. Hartman et al acknowl­
edge this possibility but they cannot include the effects 
of this possibility if their numerical analysis.3
Hartman et al also point out that a stock bonus 
plan can be especially useful to a closely-held corpora­
tion:
Contributions to the ESOP involve no flo­
tation or underwriting costs. Thus, crea­
tion of an ESOP by a small company can 
enable that firm to obtain $10 0,000 for 
$100,000 worth of stock."
A stock bonus plan may be financially advantageous 
to a corporation if it motivates workers to become more 
productive. Further, an SBP can be a financially attractive 
way for a closely-held corporation to issue additional shares 
of stock.
2Bart P. Hartman, David Laxton and William Walvoord,
"A Look at Employee Stock Ownership Plans as Financing Tools,"




Pursuant to the adoption of a leveraged ESOP, 
the ESOT obtains a bank loan, which is guaranteed by the 
corporation, and uses the proceeds to purchase stock from 
the corporation. The corporation makes subsequent cash 
contributions to the ESOT which are used to repay the 
loan. The tax deductibility of these subsequent con­
tributions has misled some analysts into thinking that 
this arrangement, in effect, permits the corporation to 
deduct both interest and principal portions of the loan 
payments. That is, the loan is repaid with pre-tax dollars 
rather than after-tax dollars. Consider the following 
statement by Kelso:
. . . (a corporation) can borrow and then 
in after-tax dollars, out of its internal 
cash flow, we repay the loan . . . Through
the ESOP, the corporation can finance its 
growth on pre-tax dollars. One pre-tax 
dollar does the work of two.5
This erroneous conclusion results from an incomplete finan­
cial analysis of a leveraged ESOP.
A leveraged ESOP produces the following favorable 
effects for existing shareholders:
1. Cash flow and net assets are increased by the 
amount of the loan.
5Stat'ement by Louis 0. Kelso, Kelso and Co., U.S. 
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Employee Stock Owner­
ship Plans (ESOPs), Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975),
pp. 134-136.
49
2. Cash flow is increased by the amount of the 
tax deduction resulting from the subsequent cash contri­
butions .
3. The shares transferred to the ESOT may, as 
mentioned above, result in an increase in worker produc­
tivity which would cause an increase in earnings, net 
assets and cash flow.
4. The increase in working capital from the 
above effects may be reinvested in the business and may 
in turn generate additional earnings which will increase 
net assets and cash flow.
The corresponding adverse effects are as follows:
1. The recording of the ESOP loan on the books 
of the corporation, as recommended by the AICPA and the 
SEC (see Chapter II'.), causes net assets to be decreased 
by the amount of the loan. This liability is reduced as 
the loan is repayed.
2. The shares transferred to the ESOT decrease 
both earnings and net assets on a per share basis.
3. The subsequent cash contributions decrease
cash flow. These contributions must also be recorded as
compensation expense (see Chapter II ) and thereby de­
crease earnings and net assets.
The above analysis and the numerical analysis pre­
sented by Hartman et al both lead to the following con­
clusion regarding the financial impact of a leveraged ESOP:
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. . . the employee corporation could achieve 
the same tax savings by borrowing directly 
from the bank, repaying the loan normally, 
and contributing stock equal to the value 
of the principal payment to any qualified 
plan.6
Kelso*s claim that a leveraged ESOP enables a com­
pany to repay a loan with pre-tax dollars simply does not 
hold up under the above analysis. This analysis clearly 
supports the assertion made by Huene:
A company, through an ESOP, does achieve 
additional tax deductions by increasing 
employee compensation - pay more, deduct 
more - but more tax deductions do not 
necessarily save money. Since all com­
pensation programs are from pre-tax 
dollars - the payments being deductible - 
one must consider whether spending pre­
tax dollars that might otherwise be 
retained necessarily reduces cost (emphasis 
in original).7
This analysis and the numerical analysis of Hart­
man et al reveal that leveraged ESOPs do not provide 
relatively low-cost debt capital. However, leveraged ESOPs 
can be used advantageously to achieve certain transfer-of- 
ownership objectives. First, a leveraged ESOP can be used 
to create a market for existing shareholders (of a closely- 
held company) who wish to dispose of a portion of their 
holdings. If a shareholder sells shares back to a closely- 
held corporation, the proceeds are generally taxed as 
ordinary income unless the redemption includes the
6Hartman et al, Management Accounting, March 1977,
p. 26.
7Herbert A. Huene, "Beware the ESOP: A Cautionary
Tale," The Tax Advisor, December 1976, p. 723.
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shareholders' total interest in the company.0 However, 
a partial sell-out to an ESOT may qualify for capital 
gain treatment. Second, a corporation can be sold to 
the employees through a leveraged ESOP. This technique 
will result in the employees assuming control of the 
corporation and the previous shareholders receiving a 
fair price for their shares. Finally, a leveraged 
ESOP can be used by a corporation to dispose of a 
division. The division would be transferred to a 
newly formed corporation, then the shares of the new 
corporation would be purchased by a leveraged ESOT.
Investment Credit ESOPs
The additional ESOP investment tax credit can 
be taken in conjunction with an existing ESOP or a new 
investment credit ESOP can be formed. Either way, the 
corporation takes the tax credit and transfers shares 
of equal value to the ESOT. The favorable effects of 
this operation to the existing shareholders are as 
follows:
1. The tax credit reduces both tax liability 
and tax expense resulting in increased cash flow, in­
creased earnings and increased net assets.
2. The transfer of shares to the ESOT may result 
in increased worker productivity which would increase 
earnings, net assets and cash flow.
3IRC section 302(c).
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3. The additional working capital from the 
above effects could be reinvested in the business and 
might generate additional earnings which would increase 
net assets and cash flow.
The corresponding adverse effects are as follows:
1. The transfer of shares to the trust reduces 
both earnings and net assets on a per share basis.
2. Compensation expense is recorded when the 
shares are transferred to the ESOT.
Since the increase in compensation expense is 
directly offset by the reduction in tax expense, the 
net result of the investment credit ESOP operation is 
that the government has purchased the stock for the 
employees. Generally, this same objective could be 
achieved by selling stock to the public at FMV. How­
ever, there are two important exceptions to this gener­
ality. First, the company may not be able to sell stock 
to the public at FMV without incurring substantial costs 
of registration and underwriting. Second, under an 
investment credit ESOP, the newly issued shares are bene­
ficially owned by the employees rather than non-employee 
shareholders, and the company may benefit from this 
employee ownership.
The Financial Decision
The analyses presented above form the framework 
necessary to make a financial management decision regarding
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ESOPs. That is, these models can be used to decide 
whether an ESOP should be adopted, continued, expanded 
or used for a particular purpose. A given firm can 
use the models by developing its own figures for the 
variables discussed.
The above analysis clearly reveals that, in 
most ESOP decision-making situations, the critical 
variables are earning power and employee motivation.
That is, an ESOP will benefit the existing shareholders 
only if the firm can earn an acceptable rate of return 
on additional working capital and if the ESOP moti­
vates workers. Earning power is an attribute that 
depends on the overall economics of a given firm. 
Employee motivation is a topic that has received con­
siderable attention in the management literature and 
is discussed below.
ESOPs and Organizational Behavior
The previous section considered the possibil­
ities of using ESOPs to achieve management goals from 
a financial point of view. This section evaluates ESOPs 
from a behavioral point of view. The importance of this 
aspect of ESOPs is evident throughout this report and 
the ESOP literature in general. This section attempts 




There are several theories of motivation which 
have been used to explain employee work behavior.9 One 
which has gained much support in the recent management 
literature is referred to as "expectancy theory.” Ex­
pectancy theory can be used as the basis for a motiv­
ation theory of ESOPs.
Steers and Porter describe expectancy theory as
follows:
. . . this theory argues that motiva­
tional force to perform - or effort - 
is a multiplicative function of the 
expectancies, or beliefs, that indi­
viduals have concerning future out­
comes times the value they place on 
those outcomes (emphasis in original).10
Mayes describes the theory conceptually with the following
equation:
Motivation = Expectancy X Valence11 
The expectancy factor in the equation is composed of two 
types of expectancies. E + P is the expectancy that in­
creased effort will lead to increased job performance.
P '-*• 0 is the expectancy that increased job performance 
will lead to a certain outcome. Valence is the value
9Richard M. Steers and Lyman W. Porter, Motivation 
and Work Behavior, (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1975),
pp. 31-218.
1°Ibid., p. 181.
1^ronston T. Mayes, "Some Boundary Considerations 
in the Application of Motivational Models," Academy of 
Management Review, January 1978, p. 52.
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associated with the anticipated outcome. A more complete 
equation would be:
M = CE h. p)(p -*■ 0)(V)
According to this theory, then, a person*s motivational 
force to perform can be influenced by changing one or more 
of the independent variables in the above equation. The 
expectancy variables are subjective probability estimates 
ranging from 0 to +1.0. Valence is a measure of preference 
ranging from -1.0 to +1.0. Therefore, an individual's 
motivation to perform a given task will be high if his 
E -*■ P and P -*■ 0 expectancies are high and if he places a 
high value (V) on the anticipated outcome of his performance.
Employee Ownership and Organizational Integration
Long studied the effects of employee ownership on 
job attitudes.12 His theoretical model hypothesized that 
employee ownership increased employee motivation by in­
creasing organizational integration. He defined organiza­
tional integration as " . . . the degree to which the indi­
vidual perceives that attainment of organizational goals 
will result in satisfaction of his personal goals and 
needs."13 He further reasoned that employee ownership 
increased integration because the major organizational
11Richard J. Long, "The Effects of Employee Owner­
ship on Job Attitudes and Organizational Performance: An




goal of profit maximization is a benefit to the employees 
if they are also owners. That is, employee ownership 
" . . . would strengthen the relationship between organi­
zational performance and individual reward CP ->• R. 1 *
*  org xnd
In terms of expectancy theory, integration affects 
the individual’s valence of increased organizational per­
formance (por,g)* That is, as integration increases, the 
employee places a higher value on the anticipated outcome 
of increased organizational performance. Long reasons 
that this increased valence of organizational performance 
might motivate a workforce in two ways. First, the in­
dividual may perceive a strong relationship between his 
own job effort and the performance of the organization.
That is, his E P and P -*■ 0 expectancies may be high where
the outcome expected is P^ . Second, an individualorg
employee might perceive a relationship between P ando
the performance of other employees ( P ^ ^ ) . Thus,
F .. •+ P . If an employee perceives that P P__.oth org oth org
he might encourage other employees to. increase their job 
effort resulting in peer pressure.15
Long tested his theory on a medium-sized trucking 
company which had recently been purchased by its employees. 
Through a series of questionnaires and interviews he 
attempted to measure changes in job attitudes resulting
1 ’Ibid.
15Ibid,, pp. 15, 16.
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from the change to employee ownership. His conclusion,
based on a statistical analysis of the data, was that job
satisfaction and job effort of the employees were both
■
increased.
ESOPs and Employee Ownership
Long's study argues well for the motivational im­
pact of employee ownership. However, the trucking com­
pany that he studied was directly owned by the employees. 
His theoretical framework and his empirical results do 
not, therefore, directly support the ESOP motivation 
theory. Additional analysis is necessary to establish 
the motivational potential of an ESOP.
Although an ESOP does not result in direct employee 
ownership of a firm, its potential as an employee motivator 
rests on the assumption that the ESOP participants per­
ceive an ownership interest flowing from the ESOP. The 
validity of this assumption is critical to the motivation 
theory of ESOPs. Therefore, a comparison of ESOP owner­
ship to direct ownership is necessary.
When an employee directly owns shares of stock in 
his employer corporation, he is truly a part owner of the 
business. As such, he possesses the various rights of 
corporate stock ownership. That is, he has the legal 
right to participate in any liquidating distributions or 
distributions of profit and to participate in shareholder
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voting. He also has the right to sell his shares at his 
discretion.
When an employee participates in an ESOP he is 
the beneficial owner of the securities that have been 
credited to his account. Two shortcomings of ESOP 
ownership may be encountered at this point. First, the 
securities credited to an employee’s ESOT account may be 
subject to vesting requirements. The employee can be 
certain of ultimately owning only the shares that have 
vested in his account. As Chapter I pointed out, invest­
ment credit ESOPs are required to grant immediate 100% 
vesting in the plan, but other ESOPs are subject only to 
the vesting requirements of ERISA. The second limitation 
of ESOP ownership relevant to the securities held in the 
trust involves the type of securities credited to an 
employee's account. Although leveraged ESOPs and invest­
ment credit ESOPs are now required to hold either common 
stock or convertible preferred, stock bonus plans may hold 
other types of investments (see Chapter I). These two 
problems could, therefore, cause an ESOP to fall substan­
tially short of direct ownership as an employee motivator.
Other limitations of ESOP ownership do not appear 
to be as serious as those discussed above. Leveraged 
ESOPs and investment credit ESOPs are required to pass­
through complete or limited voting rights to participants 
at present and SBPs will be subject to this requirement 
beginning in 1980 (see Chapter I). Dividends paid on
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stock allocated to a participant's account must either be 
credited to the account or passed-through to the par­
ticipant. Finally, the ESOP participant does not have 
the right to dispose of the stock credited to his account. 
However, this limitation should not detract from an ESOPs 
potential as a motivator. If an employee desires to sell 
his ownership interest in his employer, he apparently would 
not be motivated by either direct ownership or ESOP owner­
ship.
If an ESOP arrangement involves shares of common 
stock that are fully or partially vested, it should have 
the same motivating effects on employees as a direct owner­
ship arrangement. That is, employees participating in an
ESOP receive the same benefit from increased P  as thoseorg
who own shares directly. The wealth of an ESOP partici­
pant is increased by employer profits in the same magnitude 
as other shareholders.
The expectancy theory model of employee ownership 
developed by Long should, therefore, apply to ESOPs be­
cause the economic incentives of an ESOP are essentially 
the same as those of direct ownership. However, whether 
the theory holds in practice may depend on how well the 
details of the ESOP are communicated to the employees.
If the participants are not informed about their interests 
in the plan, they cannot perceive the benefits of employee 
ownership. The assumption that employees perceive an owner­
ship interest flowing from an ESOP appears to be. valid in
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theory, but in practice the assumption may depend on 
effective communication.
ESOPs and Communication
Because an ESOP participant does not physically 
possess any ownership shares until retirement or other 
separation from service, he cannot perceive an ownership 
interest flowing from the plan without some form of com­
munication taking place. He must, at a minimum, be in­
formed that (A) the ESOP exists and (B) the ESOT will hold 
shares of stock in his account. ERISA contains two dis­
closure requirements that would accomplish this minimum 
level of communication. First, a summary plan descrip­
tion must be given to any employee within ninety days 
after becoming a participant in the plan.16 Second, an 
annual report summary, which summarises the financial 
operation of the plan, must be distributed to partici­
pants within 210 days after the close of the plan year 
to which it applies.17 However, effective organizational 
communication beyond this minimum level could enhance the 
motivational effects of an ESOP.
The expectancy theory model reveals that the moti­
vational potential of an ESOP depends to some extent on 
the individual's P -► 0 expectancy. This expectancy can be 
enhanced by effective upward communication. That is,




employees will become more interested in organizational 
performance if they are able to communicate their ideas 
upward in the organization. Some form of employee sug­
gestion system can be used for this purpose. Sigband 
notes that:
There is value in such systems, for 
millions of dollars are saved as a 
result of employee suggestions. And 
the psychological value an employee 
receives from participation in the 
company's production procedure is 
immeasurable.10
Upward communication gives the employee more input into the 
overall performance of the organization and thus enhances 
his P 0 expectancy.
Effective downward communication can enhance the 
motivational impact of an ESOP by reinforcing the implica­
tions of employee ownership in the mind of the ESOP par­
ticipant. All three independent variables in the expec­
tancy theory model can be influended by downward communica­
tion. The individual's E P expectancy can be increased 
by communication that explains how he can perform his job 
more efficiently. An E + 0 expectancy can be increased 
by explaining how an employee's job affects organizational 
performance. Finally, an employee's valence of organiza­
tional performance can be increased by explaining how
18Norman B. Sigband, Communication for Management and 
Business, 2nd ed., (Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman and
Company, 1976), p. 27.
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increased corporate profit benefits him through the ESOP, 
Effective downward communication in all three of these 
areas should substantially enhance the motivational po­
tential of an ESOP.
ESOPs and Other Plans 
Before deciding to adopt an ESOP, management 
should consider the available alternatives. An ESOP is 
a deferred compensation program. As such, it is both a 
compensation plan and a retirement plan. Management 
should, therefore, compare ESOPs to other types of com­
pensation and retirement plans. Such comparisons are 
useful even though an ESOP can be used in combination 
with other plans. Further, these comparisons should be 
made from the point of view of the employee as well as 
the employer.
ESOPs as a Compensation Plan
If an ESOP is viewed as additional compensation, 
it should be compared to alternative nonqualified plans. 
The most comparable alternative is a bonus plan which pays 
the employee a periodic bonus above his base wage or 
salary. Bonuses are generally based on either organiza­
tional performance or on individual performance.19 A 
current profit sharing plan pays a periodic bonus based
19Robert E. Sibson, Compensation. (New York: 
AMACOM, 1974), p. 14.
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on periodic profit.20 A Scanlon plan pays a monthly or 
bimonthly bonus based on an individual's productivity.21 
Both of these plans have employee motivation potential. 
However, unlike ESOPs, they are not deferred pay plans 
and IRS qualification is not necessary. Further, bonuses 
are generally paid in cash although there is no reason 
why a bonus could not be paid in the form of corporate 
stock. If a bonus is paid in the form of corporate stock, 
the employer is allowed a tax deduction equal to the fair 
market value of the shares paid out.22
Advantages of an ESOP. For the employer, an ESOP 
offers the following advantages over a bonus plan:
1. There is no reduction in working capital when 
stock is contributed to an ESOT. However, a bonus paid in 
the form of corporate stock would have the same effect 
(i.e., a cashless tax deduction).
2. Since employer stock is held in the employee's 
ESOT account the possibility of appreciation in the value 
of such stock may provide added incentive for the employee 
to contribute to company profit. A bonus paid in the form 
of stock may be sold at the employee's discretion and may,
20Bert L. Metzger, Profit Sharing in Perspective. 
(Evanston, 111.: Profit Sharing Research Foundation,
19610, p. 1.
21 Brian E. Moore and Timothy L. Ross, The S'ca'nlon 
Way to Improved Productivity. (New York: John Wiley and
Sons , 1978), p. JO
22IRC section 83(h).
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therefore, not provide the added motivational impact of 
employee ownership.
3. An ESOP may reduce turnover. An ESOP that 
has vesting requirements may encourage employees to con­
tinue employement because separation would result in 
lost benefits.
An ESOP may permit management to maintain 
greater control of corporate ownership than a current 
stock bonus plan. Pursuant to an ESOP the stock is held 
by a trustee until distribution at which time it may be 
reacquired by the use of a right of first refusal in 
favor of the company or the ESOT.
In comparison to a bonus plan, an ESOP will pro­
vide employees with the following advantages:
1. An ESOP is, in effect, a method of forced 
savings. That is, it helps the employee provide for his 
retirement.
2. The employee acquires an ownership interest 
that he would not be able to acquire with a cash bonus 
unless the employer corporation is publicly owned. How­
ever, a bonus paid in the form of corporate stock could 
have the same effect.
3. Increases in the value of the stock held by 
the ESOT can result in extraordinary employee benefit. 
For example, a warehouse laborer retired from Lowe's
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Companies, Inc. with approximately $660,0 00 in his ESOT 
account.2 5
4. As discussed in Chapter I, ESOT distribu­
tions receive favorable tax treatment.
Disadvantages of an ESOP. As compared to a bonus
plan, an ESOP involves the following disadvantages for 
the employer:
1. An ESOP is more complex and thus more costly 
to administer. A trustee will probably be engaged and 
reports must be filed with both the IRS and the Depart­
ment of Labor. Also, if the stock is closely held, it
must be valued annually, and Ludwig strongly recommends
the use of a qualified appraiser of corporate stock.21*
2. Compared to a cash bonus plan, an ESOP 
results in dilution of ownership and earnings. Of course, 
a bonus paid in stock would have the same effect.
Employees suffer the following disadvantages under
an ESOP:
1. The employee has no control over the stock in
his ESOT account. Since he will receive the stock only
23See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans and General Stock Ownership 
Trusts, Hearings on S. 32 41, S 3 223 and H.R. 13 88 2, 95th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1978 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Printing
Office, 1978), p. 81.
2wRonald L. Ludwig, "ESOP as a Financing Vehicle," 
in Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Problems and Potentials,
ed. Richard Reichler (Law Journal-Press,, 1978) , p. 36^
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upon retirement he may never benefit from it.
2. Closely related to the first disadvantage is 
the possibility of a decline in the value of the stock 
in the ESOT. The employee may actually receive less than 
the amounts contributed in monetary terms or, again, pos­
sibly receive nothing at all.
ESOP as a Retirement Plan
As retirement plans ESOPs are usually compared to 
deferred profit sharing plans and defined benefit pension 
plans. A deferred profit sharing plan is a qualified re­
tirement plan as opposed to a current profit sharing plan 
which is simply a type of cash bonus plan. ESOPs and 
deferred profit sharing plans are similar in that they 
are both defined contribution plans as opposed to defined 
benefit plans. In a defined contribution plan the con­
tribution formula determines the ultimate retirement benefits 
payable to the participants. In a defined benefit plan 
the benefits are predetermined and the contributions are 
based on actuarial calculations that consider such factors 
as funding requirements, vesting requirements and mortality 
rates.
Advantages of an ESOP. For the employer, an ESOP 
offers the following advantages over the above-mentioned 
qualified plans:
1. There is no decrease in working capital when 
company stock is contributed to an ESOP.
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2. Since ESOP contributions are not based on 
profits, an operating loss can be created resulting in 
an immediate tax benefit.23
3. Although ESOPs and profit sharing plans are 
both incentive plans, ESOPs may result in added employee 
motivation because they create employee ownership.
4-. An ESOP is easier to administer than a defined 
benefit plan because the ERISA diversification rule does 
not apply to the trust fund assets. However, as explained 
in Chapter I, profit sharing plans are also exempted from 
this rule.
5. Neither ESOPs nor profit sharing plans can 
generate a past service liability. Further, the amounts 
contributed pursuant to an ESOP are completely flexible 
subject to the maximum benefits discussed in Chapter I.
The reader should note, however, that profit sharing con­
tributions are also flexible unless the plan includes a 
definite contribution formula.26
Compared to profit sharing and defined benefit 
plans, ESOPs offer employees the following advantages:
1. As mentioned above, ESOPs create employee 
ownership which may improve job satisfaction.
25See Hartman et al, Management Accounting, 
March 197 7, p. 23.
2 6Rev. Proc. 56-22 , 1956-2 CB 1380.
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2. Appreciation in the value of stock held in the 
trust would add to the employee benefits received under 
the plan.
Disadvantages of an ESOP. In comparison to profit 
sharing plans and defined benefit plans, ESOPs result in 
the following disadvantages for employers:
1. An ESOP causes dilution of ownership and earn­
ings.
2. Annual stock valuation is necessary for closely 
held companies.
Employees suffer the following disadvantages 
under an ESOP as compared to other plans:
1. No credit is received for past service under 
ESOPs or profit sharing plans.
2. The lack of diversification in the trust fund 
assets exposes the employees to increased risk.
3. Because of the flexibility in contributions, 
an ESOP may offer less security than either profit sharing 
or defined benefit plans.
Combinations
Various combinations of the plans discussed above 
are possible and may be desirable. For example, an ESOP 
can be combined with profit sharing to form what Metzger 
refers to as an EPSOP (employee profit sharing and
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ownership plan.)27 This objective can be achieved either
by a profit sharing plan investing heavily in employer
stock or by basing ESOP contributions on company profits.
As another alternative, a company might use an ESOP as
a supplemental plan to a conventional defined benefit
*
plan. Such a combination would avoid several of the dis­
advantages listed above. However, the reader should note 
that each additional plan requires additional administrative 
expense.
Summary
From the perspective of corporate management,
ESOPs have financial, behavioral and other administrative 
implications. ESOP decision making requires separate 
analysis in each of these managerial areas.
The financial effects of an ESOP should be ana­
lyzed in terms of the welfare of the existing stockholder 
group. Each type of ESOP will have a different financial 
impact on a corporation. A stock bonus plan is equal 
financially to selling stock to the public and making cash 
contributions to a qualified retirement plan unless it 
motivates employees to become more productive. A leveraged 
ESOP produces financial results identical to conventional 
borrowing combined with contributions of stock directly to 
an ESOT. However, a leveraged ESOP may be useful as a 
transfer-of-ownership financing vehicle. Finally, an
27Hearings, 197 8,, p. 538.
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investment credit ESOP, in effect, results in a govern­
ment purchase of employer stock for the employees. The 
financial effects of an investment credit ESOP, then, 
are the same as selling stock to the public unless it 
motivates the employees.
ESOPs may affect organizational behavior by 
motivating the workforce. The motivation potential 
of an ESOP can be explained by the expectancy theory 
model of motivation:
Motivation = Expectancy X Valence 
where expectancy generally refers to an employee's expec­
tations that his job performance leads to an anticipated 
outcome and valence is the value associated with that out­
come by the employee. An ESOP may cause the employee 
to associate increased job effort with increased profits 
and, consequently, with increased personal reward. How­
ever, the motivation potential of an ESOP may, in practice, 
depend on effective communication of the plan details to 
the participants.
Before an ESOP decision is made based on the above 
analyses, ESOPs should be compared to other alternative 
plans. As a compensation plan, an ESOP should be compared 
to some type of nonqualified bonus plan. As a retirement 
plan, an ESOP should be compared to a profit sharing plan 
and to a defined benefit plan. ESOPs have advantages and
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disadvantages when compared to each of these alternative 
plans. An optimal result may involve some combination 
of these plans.
CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION 
Introduction
This study was carried out in two phases. First, 
an economic model was formulated to test the general hy­
potheses of the study. Second, a survey of ESOP companies 
was conducted in order to provide the empirical data for 
the model. This chapter describes these two phases of the 
study. The first part of the chapter discusses the formu­
lation of a general economic model, the general hypotheses, 
and the variables of the specified model. The second part 
of the chapter discusses the survey which provided the em­
pirical data for the study.
Statement of the Problem 
Chapter I reviewed the development of ESOPs with em­
phasis on their popularity since 1974. ESOP popularity 
raised the issue of tax incentives designed to encourage 
ESOP formation. ESOP advocates contend that ESOPs increase 
business productivity through increased employee motiva­
tion. Chapter I also discussed the important policy im­
plications related to ESOP motivation theory.
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Clearly, more evidence is needed to support this 
theory. Chapter I discussed the tax benefits of ESOP 
formation to corporations and to the employees of these 
corporations. The social cost of the tax benefits was also 
discussed in Chapter I. Is the social cost of decreased 
tax revenues justified by increased business efficiency?
The purpose of this study, as mentioned, is to provide 
evidence which can be useful to government and corporate 
policy makers with respect to ESOP formation. Specifically, 
this study attempts to determine (A) whether any relation­
ship exists between company operating performance and ESOPs 
and (B) the nature of any relationship which might be found 
to exist.
Formulation of the Model 
The stated objective of this study suggests the 
following general economic model:
Y = f(E,e)
where Y = company operating performance, E = ESOP, and
e - the general disturbance or error term in the equation.
Models such as the foregoing are known as error-in-the-
equation models and are explained by Huang as follows:
Models that admit errors or disturbances 
in their behavioral equations, in general, 
are amenable to statistical test. Now, 
error in an equation arises either because 
the knowledge concerning the behavior to be 
modeled is imperfect (as to the functional 
form and the variables to be used), or be­
cause practical considerations make it
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necessary -to limit attention to a 
number of crucial variables. 1
An explanatory model in the above form can be
specified with company operating performance acting as
the criterion variable and certain quantifiable charac
teristics of an ESOP acting as explanatory varibles.
The General Hypotheses
The general hypotheses of the study are as fol­
lows :
Cl) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the ESOP-related variables.
(2) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the percentage of a 
company's stock owned by the ESOP.
(3) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the size of the contri­
bution that has been made to the ESOP.
(4) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the period of time the 
ESOP has been in existence.
(5) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the percentage of ESOP- 
covered employees who have vested 
interests in the ESOP.
In general, hypothesis Cl) pertains to the overall 
explanatory power of the model. Each of the other four
1David S. Huang, Regression and Econometric 
Methods, (New York: John Wxley S^Sons, Inc., 197 0), p. 5.
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hypotheses pertains to the significance of an explanatory 
variable in the model.
The Multiple Linear Regression Model
Considering the above hypotheses, the following 
theoretical model can be specified:
y = e 0 + 3 iXi + $2x 2 + e3x 3 + + e
where:
Y = company operating performance
= the true coefficients of the model
e = the error term in the model
Xi = percentage of company stock owned by the ESOP
X 2 = size (as a percentage of payroll) of the prior
year contribution to the ESOP
X 3 = period of time the ESOP has been in existence
Xtt = percentage of ESOP-covered employees who have 
vested interests in the plan
These specifications represent a linear explanatory model 
designed to estimate the relationships among the variables 
of interest in the study.
The above model was estimated by the statistical 
method of least squares using the survey data collected 
by the questionnaires. The least squares method was 
executed by a computer using the matrix inversion tech­
nique which is part of the SPSS system of programs.2
2Norman H. Nie, C. Hadlai Hull, Jean G. Jenkins, 
Karin Steinbrenner, and Dale H. Bent, Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill "
Book Co., Inc., 1975), pp. 320-67.
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The basic behavior unit for the model is the firm 
that has an ESOP. The survey data were collected from a 
sample of firms and the data represent activity in the 
year of 1977. Klein describes this approach to econo­
metrics as follows:
A group of business accounting statements, 
covering a given period of operations, would 
also form a cross-section sample from which 
to estimate business patterns of behavior 
on the basis of inter-firm variations.3
The-first hypothesis was tested by a test of sig­
nificance- on R 2. In this test the null hypothesis is 
Ho: R 2 = 0 against the alternate H : R 2 i 0. The otherd
four hypotheses were tested by performing one-tailed t 
tests on the values and the signs of the coefficients 
which were estimated by the regression method. The null 
hypothesis for a one-tailed t test on a coefficient in a 
regression equation is H 0: = 0. The alternate hypo­
thesis is either H : B. > 0 or H : B. < 0 depending on
cL JC 3. X
the theory underlying the explanatory variable X^. ‘f
The Criterion Variables
As discussed above, company operating performance 
is the criterion variable in the model which has been for­
mulated. For the purpose of this study, operating
3Lawrence R. Klein, An Introduction to Econo- 
metrics, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1962), p. 5.
^See James L. Murphy, Introductory Econometrics, 
(Homewood, 111.: Richard D, Irwin, Inc., 19 73),
pp. 205-14.
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performance is defined as profitability. Further, two 
measures of company profit ware used in the study both 
of which were normalized for interfirm and interindustry 
comparisons.
As discussed in Chapter I, Conte and Tannenbaum 
used a regression model similar to the one which is for­
mulated above.5 The criterion variable in that model was 
the ratio of pretax net income to sales divided by the 
like ratio for the industry to which the firm belongs.
The present study employed a similar criterion variable 
except that it is composed of operating income with 
depreciation added back.s The advantage of this variable 
is that it does not contain the effects of depreciation, 
interest, other nonoperating income items, extraordinary 
items, or taxes which are all extraneous variables in 
this study. This method of measuring profitability also
controls many extraneous variables of a macroeconomic 
and microeconomic nature. For example, if a company is 
benefiting from a general expansion in the U.S. economy, 
then most other firms in that industry are likewise
sMichael Conte and Arnold S. Tannenbaum, "Em­
ployee-Owned Companies: Is the Difference Measurable?,"
Monthly Labor Review, July 1978, pp. 23-28.
5Industry data were taken from the following 
sources: Analystrs Handbook, (New York: Standard S Poor's
Corp., 1977); Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, Vol 1,
(New York: Moody's Investors Services, Inc. , 1978 ); RMA
Annual Statement Studies, (Philadelphia: Robert Morris
Associates, 19 77); The Value Line Investment Survey, (New 
York: A. Bernhard 6 Co., loose-leaf service).
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benefiting. Alternatively, if a company is suffering 
from cost increases brought on by a shortage of a key 
raw material, then, again, most other firms in that 
industry are likewise suffering.
A second criterion variable (after-tax net 
income divided by sales) was also used in this study. 
After-tax income was used in this criterion variable 
to evaluate the relationship between company profi­
tability and the ESOP on an after-tax basis. This 
analysis focuses on the tax benefit which is received 
by the ESOP company.
These two criterion variables were used to form 
two separate models. That is, two separate models were 
formed when each criterion variable was regressed against 
the common set of explanatory variables developed above. 
Comparing the coefficients of these two models may add 
insight to the analysis. The relationships contained 
in the operating income model should reflect the indirect 
benefits of increased employee productivity and increased 
working capital provided by the ESOP. These relation­
ships were likewise present in the net income model. 
However, the direct tax benefit is also contained in 
the net income model. Therefore, if the statistical 
tests indicate stronger relationships in the net income 
model, the analysis would suggest that companies tend to 
benefit more from the ESOP tax deduction than from the 
other indirect effects.
The Explanatory Variables
The explanatory variables in the model relate to 
hypotheses (2) through (5). These variables represent 
certain quantifiable characteristics of an ESOP and are 
explained in the following paragraphs.
•
Percentage of company stock owned by the ESOP 
(Xi). This variable measures the proportion of company 
ownership held by the employees through the ESOP. In­
creased employee ownership of a company should result 
in increased employee awareness of company profit. The 
employees' ownership interest in the company becomes more 
valuable as company profit increases. Therefore, the 
coefficient of this variable should be positive indicat­
ing a positive relationship between company profit and 
employee ownership. The null hypothesis with respect to 
Xi is H 0 : Bi = 0 against the alternate H : Bi > 0.cl
Size (as a percentage of payroll) of the prior 
year contribution to the ESOP (X2). This variable 
measures the size of the most recent benefit received by 
the employees as a result of the ESOP. X2 focuses on the 
magnitude of the benefit that is received by an individual 
employee. Consider, for example, two ESOP companies M 
and N. Company M makes a contribution equal to 15% of 
its covered payroll. Company N, on the other hand, 
makes a contribution equal to 5% of its covered payroll. 
Clearly, the employees of M have received the larger
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benefit. Now assume further that immediately after these 
two contributions are made, M is 10% ESOP-owned and N is 
50% ESOP-owned. The employees of N clearly have a larger 
ownership interest CXi) in their company. This example 
illustrates that Xi and X 2 measure very different charac­
teristics of an ESOP.
The reason for using the prior year contribution 
is that ESOP contributions are generally made at the end 
of a fiscal year. Thus during 1977 the employees of an 
ESOP company are aware of the 19 7 6 contribution. They 
will not be aware of the 19 7 7 contribution until it is 
made probably early in 197 8 . As mentioned, the income 
statement data collected in the survey reflect 197 7 
activity. Therefore, X 2 reflects 1976 ESOP contributions.
Theoretically, larger ESOP contributions should 
result in increased employee morale. Since increased 
employee morale could logically be expected to result in 
better employee performance and increased company profits, 
the coefficient of X 2 should be positive. The null hypo­
thesis with respect to X 2 is H o : B 2 = 0 against the
alternate H : B 2 > 0.a
Period of time the ESOP has been in existence. ( X 3 ) . 
This variable measures the period of time from inception 
of the ESOP to the date of the company's 1977 financial 
statements. There are two theories in the ESOP field 
regarding this variable.
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The first theory states that employee motivation 
is increased when an ESOP is formed and then diminishes 
over time. The logic that supports this theory is that 
the formation of an ESOP is accompanied by a good deal 
of publicity. However, after the ESOP is in place, 
the publicity disappears. Therefore, the employees are 
aware of the ESOP when it is formed but the awareness 
gradually diminishes with the passage of time from that 
point. Based on this theory, the null hypothesis with 
respect to X 3 is H 0: B 3 = 0 against the alternate
H _ : B 3 < 0. That is, an inverse relation relation-GL
ship is expected between company profit and the period 
of time the ESOP has been in existence.
The second theory states that employee motiva­
tion is affected very little at the inception of an ESOP 
but is gradually increased with the passage of time from 
that point. The employees do not at first perceive the 
ESOP as a significant benefit; however, as time passes, 
two things happen which tend to change this perception. 
First, an employee becomes increasingly aware that com­
pany shares are being credited to his ESOP account. 
Second, he observes the actual distribution of shares 
to retiring and other terminating employees. The result 
of this changing perception is that the motivational 
impact of an ESOP increases over time from its inception. 
Therefore, the expectation is for a positive relation­
ship between company profit and the period of time the
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ESOP has been in existence. Based on this theory, then, 
the null hypothesis with respect to X 3 is H 0: B 3 = 0
and the alternate H : B 3 > 0.cL
Percentage of ESOP-covered employees who have 
* vested interests in the plan (Xtt). This variable measures 
the proportion of ESOP participants who have earned the 
irrevocable right to receive some or all of the company 
shares that have been credited to their ESOP accounts. 
Theoretically, an ESOP participant does not perceive 
the ESOP as a significant benefit, unless he actually 
has a vested interest in the plan. Without a vested 
interest in the plan a participant cannot be certain that 
he will ever receive any benefits from the plan. Thus, 
the expectation is for a positive relationship between 
company profit and the percentage of ESOP-covered employees 
who have vested interests in the plan. The null hypo­
thesis with respect to Xi, is H 0 : Bt* = 0 and the alter­
nate H : > 0.
cl
Subset Analysis
The sample companies were grouped into somewhat 
homogeneous subsets to make the analysis more meaningful. 
The 1972 edition of the Standard Industrial Classifica­
tion Manual organizes U.S. business firms into eleven 
categories, CA) through (K). By eliminating and com­
bining categories the sample companies were grouped 




Subset Designation SIC Categories
Manufacturing Group (C), CD)
Trading Group (F), (G)
Service Group (E), (H), (I)
As noted in the following chapter, eight regression 
equations were computed. An equation was computed for 
each subset and for the whole sample (pooled data) in 
each of the two regression models described above.
Survey of ESOP Companies 
The data for the study were collected by sending 
a questionnaire to companies that have been identified as 
potential ESOP companies by the ESOP Council of America. 
This mailing list was also used as the data source for 
the UCLA study discussed in Chapter I.
The Questionnaire Mailing
The questionnaire which appears in the Appendix 
was mailed to 1136 companies on June 16, 1378. A follow-up 
mailing occurred on July 28, 19 78. Further, forty-four 
companies selected randomly from the mailing list were 
contacted by telephone during the month of October 1978.
The results of the survey are presented in Table 3. 
Since some of the companies on the ESOP Council mailing
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list are not ESOP companies, the response rate on the 
mailing must be estimated. As indicated in the table, 
the UCLA study contained an estimate of 85 0 ESOP com­
panies on the mailing list. 7 However, fifteen of the 
forty-four companies contacted by telephone, indicated 
that they do not have ESOPs. This proportion (15/44) 
is used to arrive at the estimate of 7 50 ESOP companies.
The difference between the two estimates may be at least 
partially accounted for by companies that have discon­
tinued their ESOPs. In the telephone survey, six com­
panies (of the fifteen without ESOPs) indicated that 
they had discontinued their ESOPs. The UCLA study pre­
ceded the present study by approximately one year.
As shown in Table 3, 165 of the 207 questionnaires 
returned were usable. Based on the above estimates, the 
usable questionnaires represent a response rate in the 
area of 20%. Most of the questionnaires that were not 
usable failed to provide profit information. Since most 
of the companies surveyed are closely-held corporations, 
the refusal to provide profit information is not surprising. 
Further, the 16 5 usable responses were distributed among 
the subsets as follows:
7Matthew Bonaccorsco, Sheridan Cranmer, David 
Greenhut, Daphne Hoffman, and Niel Isbrandtsen, “Survey 
of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Analysis and Evalu­











Total mailed 113 6
Estimated number of
ESOP companies on
mailing list 7 50* 850**
Total returned 207 27, 6% 24.3%
Total usable 165 2 2. 0% 19.4%
Returned too late 2
*Based on telephone survey
**Based on UCLA estimate
Test for Nonresponse Bias
Although a 2 0% response rate is not abnormal for 
a survey like the one described above, the problem of 
nonresponse bias in the sample must be considered. That 
is, the sample may be biased if there are differences 
between those companies that responded to the survey and 
those that did not. Oppenheim found that late respondents 
to a mail survey are similar to nonrespondents and sug­
gested that nonresponse bias may be detected by comparing
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early returns to late returns.8 This approach to the 
problem of nonresponse bias is referred to in the sur­
vey literature as extrapolation. Armstrong and Overton 
tested for the effectiveness of extrapolation in esti­
mating nonresponse bias and found it to be 80% accurate.9
To test for nonresponse bias in this survey the 
first thirty questionnaires received were compared to 
the last thirty questionnaires received. The t test of 
significant difference between sample means was-used to 
determine whether these two groups of questionnaires 
were from different populations. The null hypothesis 
for the t test is H o : Pi = P2 against the alternate 
H : pi i pa- A two-tailed test is used with a = .10.cL
The significance level is set at .10 because the risk 
of a type II error is critical in this test. A type II 
error is the acceptance of H 0 when it is false.
Table 4- presents the results of the t tests for 
all of the variables used in the models. The calculated 
t values indicate that the null hypothesis could not be 
rejected for any variable. By referring to Appendix C 
of Murphy the critical t value for a = .10 and 58 
(30 + 3 0 - 2) degrees of freedom can be stated as
8A.N. Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design and Attitude 
Measurement, (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,1966), p. 34-.
9J.,Scott Armstrong, and Terry S. Overton, 
"Estimating Nonresponse Bias in Mail Surveys," Journal 
of Marketing Research, Vol. XIV (August 1977), pT 399.
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1.671 < t < 1,684.10 The test, therefore, gives no 
evidence of nonresponse bias.
TABLE 4 







Operating income ratio 1. 155 .949 1 . 020
Net income ratio 1.545 1.582 1.131
Percentage of company 
stock owned by the ESOP 18.787 21.027 1.131
Size (as a percentage 
of payroll) of the 
prior year contribu­
tion to the ESOP 8 . 860 11.397 1.204
Period of time the ESOP 
has been in existence 33.533 34.567 1.104
Percentage of ESOP- 
covered employees who 
have vested interests 
in the plan 55.567 66.600 1. 054
Questionnaire Validity and Reliability
A questionnaire such as the onei used in this study
is a measuring instrument. As such, the problems of
validity and reliability must be considered. These problems 
are concisely described by Ary et al as follows:
1“Murphy, Introductory Econometrics, p. 501.
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Validity refers to the extent to which an 
instrument measures what it is supposed to 
measure. Reliability, on the other hand, 
is the extent to which a measuring device 
is consistent in measuring whatever it 
measures.11
In evaluating the seriousness of these two problems to a 
research project one must consider the nature of the data 
being collected. The data collect ad in the survey dis­
cussed above are enumerative. That is, the subjects were 
asked to provide numerical information from their records. 
This type of survey is analogous to a survey requesting 
individuals to give their ages.
Validity is not a serious problem where enu­
merative data are involved. For example, consider again 
a questionnaire that requests an individual to give his 
age. Most reasonable people would accept the number of 
years from date of birth to present as being a valid 
measure of age. On the other hand, a questionnaire that 
seeks to measure the native intelligence of an individual 
has serious problems of validity. The measures generated 
by such an instrument would be seriously challenged as 
being valid measures of native intelligence. Kerlinger 
concurs with this view that validity is not a serious 
problem in certain kinds of research projects:
When measuring certain physical properties 
and relatively simple attributes of persons,
11Donald Ary, L.C. Jacobs, and A. Razaviek, Intro­
duction to Research in Education, (New York: Holt Rine­
hart and Winston, Inc.,_19 7 2), p . 190.
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validity is no great problem. There 
is-often rather direct and close con­
gruence between the nature of the 
object measured and the measuring instrument. 12
The data collected in this study appear to be in the 
category of "relatively simple attributes." The ques­
tionnaire, which is reproduced in the Appendix, requested 
the subject firms to provide the information needed for 
the five variables discussed above. This information 
was taken directly from business records and required no 
processing by the respondent. Therefore, the data col­
lected by the questionnaire were accepted as valid 
measures of the variables involved in the study and none 
of the generally accepted tests for validity were con­
sidered necessary or appropriate.
Reliability, on the other hand, is a serious con­
sideration in any data gathering effort. Kerlinger ex­
plains that reliability is simply a question of accuracy: 
"Are the measures obtained from a measuring instrument 
the true'measures of the property measured?"13 Checking 
the reliability of a questionnaire can be a difficult if 
not impossible task. Again, the best approach depends on 
the nature of the data that are collected. A method 
referred to in the survey literature as the "record check"
12Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral 
Research, 2nd ed., (New York! Holt,Rinehart and Winston,
Inc., 19 73), p. 455.
13Ibid., p. 443.
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seems to be the most appropriate way of testing the 
reliability of the questionnaire used in this study. 1,1 
This method simply involves the checking of information 
on a completed questionnaire against a published record. 
Although most of the corporations in the present survey 
are closely held and many did not identify themselves, 
seven questionnaires were identified as coming from 
publicly-held companies. The financial data from these 
questionnaires were checked against the information' in 
Standard and Poors Corporate Records and only rounding 
differences were detected. This test is admittedly 
quite limited in scope and the results must be taken 
cautiously, nonetheless, some evidence of reliability 
is provided.
Limitations of the Study
This s.tudy falls into the category of ex post
facto research. That is, the analysis is based on non-
experimental observations. Kerlinger acknowledges that
ex post facto research suffers generally from a lack of
experimental control but he defends it as follows:
It can even be said that ex post facto 
research is more important than experi­
mental research. This is, of course, 
not a methodological observation. It 
means, rather, that the most important 
social scientific and educational
ltfPauline V. Young, Scientific Social Surveys and 
Research, 4th ed., (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1966), p. 207.
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research problems do not lend themselves 
to experimentation, although many of them 
do lend themselves to controlled inquiry 
of the ex post facto kind.1s
He also offers a piece of advice that would apply to the
reader of this report:
. . .. always treat the results and inter­
pretations of the data of ex post facto 
investigations with great care and cau­
tion. Where one must be careful with 
experimental results and interpretations, 
one must be doubly careful with ex post 
facto results and interpretations. 16
Along with these general thoughts expressed by Kerlinger,
the reader should also consider the following specific
limitations of this study.
The Sample
The sample data were gathered from the question­
naires returned in the survey. This sampling method 
limits the study in two respects. First, the popul­
ation from which the sample was selected must be limited 
to those firms known to have ESOPs. Firms which have 
ESOPs but have not been identified by the ESOP Council 
of America are thus not included in the population. Like­
wise, firms which have not formed ESOPs are not included 
in the population. The second limitation resulting from 
the sampling method is caused by the non-respondents to




to the survey. The response rate, as noted, was low.
The possibility of nonresponse bias must be considered 
even though the results of the nonresponse bias test 
yield no evidence of such a problem.
Because of these limitations the representative- 
ness of the sample data may be questioned. Certainly 
one cannot assert that the sample is representative of 
all business firms in the U. S. However, the sample 
should be representative of those firms that have formed 
ESOPs. The ESOP Council of America mailing list is thought 
to be a fairly complete list of all companies that had 
formed ESOPs in time to provide the kind of information 
needed for this study. Assuming that the sample contains 
no significant nonresponse bias, then, it should be 
representative of those firms that have actually formed 
ESOPs.
Causality
The study was associative in nature. That is, the 
regression method associates variation in profit with var­
iation in the ESOP-related variables. If these relation­
ships are found to have statistical significance, the 
reader should note that correlation —  not causation —  
has been shown.
The presence of statistically significant relation­
ships in the analysis could, of course, be indicative of 
causality. That is, the relationships may result because 
ESOPs cause companies to be more profitable. However,
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one must recognize other possible explanations. For 
example, there is the possibility that companies which 
are more profitable are more likely to form ESOPs.
This study, then, cannot prove causality. This 
limitation, however, should not detract from the signif­
icance of the study. This assertion finds support 
throughout the research literature. The following quote 
from Kerlinger is representative of this view of cau­
sality in scientific research:
The position taken in this book is that 
the study of cause and causation is an 
endless maze. One of the difficulties 
is that the word "cause" has surplus 
meaning and metaphysical overtones.
Perhaps more important, it is not 
really needed. Scientific research can 
be done without invoking cause and causal 
explanations, even though the words that 
imply cause are almost impossible to 
avoid and will occasionally be used.17
Summary
Because of the recent popularity of ESOPs and 
because this popularity is tied to tax incentives, the 
basic macroeconomic cost-benefit issue has been raised.
In order to provide economic and corporate policy makers 
with evidence relative to this issue the study attempts 
to determine CA) whether any relationship exists between 
company operating performance and ESOPs and (B) the nature 
of any relationship which might be found to exist.
17Ibid., p. 393.
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Using the method of multiple linear regression the 
following model was estimated:
Y = (3q + BiXj + 62^2 "*■ S 3X 3 + + s
where Y is a measure of company operating performance and 
the are ESOP-related variables. The general hypo­
theses of the study were tested by statistically testing 
the following null hypotheses relative to this model:
H 0: R 2 = Q 
H 0: = 0.
Eight estimating equations were developed by using 
two different measures of company operating performance 
and by dividing the sample data into three separate sub­
sets. Normalized versions of operating income and net 
income were used as different measures of company opera­
ting performance. The sample data were divided into manu­
facturing, trading, and service company subsets.
A questionnaire was mailed to 113 6 potential ESOP 
companies. A total of 20 7 questionnaires were returned,
16 5 of which were usable. The usable responses constitute 
a response rate of approximately 20% since the number of 
actual ESOP companies on the mailing list is estimated to 
be between 750 and 850.
The overall soundness of the data was tested in 
two ways. First, in a test for nonresponse bias, thirty 
early responses were statistically compared to thirty 
late responses. The test gave no evidence of nonresponse
bias. Second, in a test for reliability, financial data 
from seven questionnaires returned by publicly-held 
corporations were checked against information contained 
in Standard and Poors Corporation Records and only rounding 
differences were detected.
CHAPTER V
DATA ANALYSIS AND TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the
results of the statistical analysis of the data. As
discussed in the preceding chapter, the linear regres­
sion model which is employed in this study is
y = Bo + 5iXl + e2x 2 + e3x 3 + e^x* + e
where Y can be either the operating income ratio or the
net income ratio. The two criterion variables, then, 
form two separate models when each is regressed against 
the common set of explanators X^.
These two models were tested in three phases. 
First, a test was performed to determine whether the sam­
ple data should be pooled or disaggregated in the models. 
Second, the general hypotheses of the study were tested 
in conformity with the results of the first test.
Finally, appropriate tests were performed relative to the 





The data were statistically analyzed to determine 
whether the hypothesized relationships are significantly 
different among the subsets which were described in the 
previous chapter. The Chow test was employed for this 
purpose. This test is described by Murphy as ". . . a  
test of equality between coefficients in two identical 
models based on two different data sets."1
To perform the Chow test separate regression 
equations were calculated for the subsets and the pooled 
data. The test indicates whether there are significant 
differences among the coefficients of the subsets.
If there are no significant differences the data should 
be pooled and no separate analysis should be made of the 
subsets. That is, no differences would exist in the 
hypothesized relationships among the subsets.
In this test the null hypothesis is Ho: =
^T = where r refers to the matrix of coefficients 
of the explanatory variables in a multiple 
regression model and the subscripts M, T, S refer to the 
manufacturing, trading and service company subsets. The 
alternative hypothesis is: Ha : i i Tg.
The results of the Chow test are presented in 
Table 5. In general, the test compares the residual sum
Barnes L. Murphy, Introductory Econometrics, 














Pooled Residual 160 18 6.4-5 7
Sum of Individual 150 157.167 1.0478
Difference 10 29.290 2.9290 2. 795
Net Income Model
Pooled Residual 160 48 9. 3 4-2
Sum of Individual 150 469.453 3.1297
Difference 10 19.8 89 1.9889 .635
F C.01S 10/150) = 2,44
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of squares from the pooled least squares regression to 
the total of the residual sums of squares from the separ­
ate subset least squares regressions. Mean squares are 
calculated for the individual subset residuals and for 
the difference between the two sum of squares amounts.
An F ratio is then formed from these two mean squares.
Table 5 reflects the F ratios for both sets of regres­
sion equations. As discussed in the preceding chapter, 
the first model employs the operating income ratio as 
the criterion variable whereas the second model employs 
the net income ratio as the criterion variable. From 
Appendix D of Murphy the critical value of F for 10 and 
ISO degrees of freedom at the .01 level of significance 
is 2 .1J-U.2
The null hypothesis of the test was rejected for 
the operating income model but not for the net income 
model. The Chow test results indicate that the data should 
be disaggregated in the analysis of the operating income 
model while pooling of the data would be appropriate for 
analysis of the net income model.
Tests of the General Hypotheses
Overall Significance of the Models
The first general hypothesis tested was:
Cl) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating
2Ibid, p. 205.
10 0
performance and the ESOP-related 
variables. H 0: R 2 = 0.
This hypothesis focuses on the overall explanatory power 
of the multiple regression models that have been developed.
The overall significance of a multiple regres­
sion model can be measured by the multiple coefficent of 
determination R 2. From Murphy,
R 2y 23 = Variation of Y explained by X 2 and X 3 
Total variation of Y 
in the case of a model with two explanators X 2 and X 3 .3 
Of course, a high R 2 is indicative of a highly significant 
model.
As explained by Murphy, R 2 can be tested for 
statistical significance. * The null hypothesis for the 
test is H □: R 2 = 0. The test statistic is given by
Murphy as:
F = mean square explained
CK-1, T-K) mean square residual
where K is the number of parameters in the regression 
equation and T is the number of observations. 3
Table 6 presents the results of the R 2 signifi­
cance tests for all equations in both models. The null hy­
pothesis was rejected in the operating income model for the
3Ibid. , p. 1<46.
‘Ibid. , p. 205 .
5Ibid . , p. 208 .
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pooled data and for the manufacturing group both at the 
.019 level of significance. The Chow test, however, 
indicated that pooling the data in this model was not 
appropriate. On the other hand, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level 
in the net income model.
TABLE 6
OVERALL SIGNIFICANCE OF REGRESSION EQUATIONS
F Value 
Significance 
R z F Value Level
. 0708 3. 01+8 . 019




Pooled Data C N  = 165) . 0363 1.509 .202
Manufacturing GroupC N  = 80) . 0675 1. 357 .257
Trading Group CN = 40) . 0756 .535 . 711
Service Group CN S 45) . 0554 .587 .674
Operating Income Model
Pooled Data (N = 16 5)
Manufacturing Group 
CN = 80)
Trading Group CN = 40)
Service Group CN = 45)
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The R 2 significance tests were consistent with 
the Chow test. In the operating income model the manu­
facturing group R 2 was statistically significant while 
the R 2 statistics of the other two groups were not 
statistically different from zero. In the net income 
model none of the R2 statistics were significant.
Significance of the Individual Coefficients
The hypotheses tested in this section were:
(2) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the percentage of a com­
pany's stock owned by the ESOP.
Hq : Bi = 0 .
(3) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the size of the contri­
bution that has been made to the ESOP.
Ho* - 0.
(MO There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the period of time the 
ESOP has been in existence.
Ho" Ba — 0.
(5) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the percentage of ESOP- 
covered employees who have vested 
interests in the ESOP. H 0: Bi* = 0.
The hypotheses were tested by performing t tests on the
coefficients B^ of the explanators. The results of the
t tests are given in Table 7 for the operating income model
and in Table 8 for the net income model.
In Table 7, the results for the manufacturing 












Pooled Data (N = 16S)
Xi .004 .095 1.073
x2 .025 .17 9 1.991**
x s -.005 -.077 .973
Xu .004 .140 1.826*
Constant .797 - 3.387**
Manufacturing Comoanies 
(N = 80)
x, .006 .215 1.757*
X 2 .aiH .181 1.467
Xi 005 -.136 1.244
X, . 004 .215 1.992**




x* . 050 .282 1.560
Xi .002 .033 . 207x„ . 011 .267 1.567
Constant .222 - .344




Xz .028 .132 .662
x, -.014 .187 1. 083
Xu .004 .096 . 535
Constant 1.260 — 2.326**
*Significant at .05 level; **Significant at .025 level
TABLE B 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 








Pooled Data CN = 165)
Xi -.003 -.040 .446
Xz .030 .140 1.525
Xj .009 .094 1.166
X. -.004 -.090 1.153
Constant 1.S17 - 3.978**
Manufacturing Companies 
CN = 80)
Xi .006 .084 .657
X 2 .011 .058 .453
X 3 .020 .205 1.796*
X, -.001 -.025 .221
Constant .972 - 1.731*
Trading Companies 
CN = *+0)
Xi -.006 -.064 .319
X j .052 .178 .927
X 3 -.005 -.040 .901
X* -.013 -.192 1.071
Constant 2.611 - 2.320**




X 2 .050 .265 1.358
x3 -.001 -.012 .071
X.. -.003 -.098 .599
Constant 1.556 — 3.293**
*Significant at .OS level; ** Significant at .025 level
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indicated that pooling the data in this model is not 
appropriate. In the manufacturing group the null hypo­
thesis was rejected at the .05 level of significance 
with respect to Xi and Bi > 0. This result suggests that 
there was a statistically significant positive relation­
ship between operating income and percentage of company 
stock owned by the ESOP with respect to manufacturing 
companies. The null hypothesis was also rejected at the 
. 025 level of significance with respect to Xi» and B* > 0. 
This result suggests that there was a statistically sig­
nificant positive relationship between operating income and 
the percentage of ESOP-covered employees who have vested 
interests in the plan with respect to manufacturing com­
panies. Further, the standardized regression coefficients 
Cbeta weights) indicate that Xi and X* were of equal 
importance as explanators in the model for manufacturing 
companies.
The null hypothesis H 0: = 0 cannot be rejected
in any of the other equations in Tables 7 and 8 . In the 
manufacturing group of the net income model (Table 8), X 3 
was significant at the .05 level. However, the Chow test 
indicated that the data should be pooled in this model. 
Consequently, the three tests that have been performed on 
the two models indicate that statistically significant 
relationships exist only for the manufacturing group in the 
operating income model.
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Tests on the Assumptions of the Multiple 
Regression Model 
Since certain of the hypothesized relationships of 
the study appear to exist in the operating income manu­
facturing company model, this model was further tested for 
validity. That is, tests were performed which would have 
indicated whether certain assumptions of the multiple re­
gression model had been violated. If an assumption was 
violated the specified model could not be accepted as a 
valid model.
The Assumptions
Murphy lists seven underlying assumptions for the
general multiple linear regression model containing k
exogenous variables and T observations:
Cl) The exogenous variables are fixed rather 
than random so that (X’X) is a matrix of 
real numbers, and the vector of values 
for any X^, k = 2, 3 . . ., K is inde­
pendent of the disturbance term.
(2) For t a 1, 2, . . ,, T, e+ is a normally
distributed random variable.
(3) For t = 1, 2, . , ., T, the expectation
of is zero.
C4-) F o r t  = 1, 2, . . ., T, et has a finite
variance <r£.t
(5) Noncontemporaneous disturbances are in­
dependently distributed. For any t i s ,
both t, s, = 1 ,  2, . . ., T, ECs e ) = 0.t s
(6) The number of observations exceeds the 
number of coefficients to be estimated:
T > K.
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(7) The set of predetermined variables, X 2 ,
X 3, . . Xk are linearly independent 
so that CX'X)-1 exists.6
Murphy also notes generally that it is impractical 
to check for all the assumptions because all possible sam­
ples of the variables cannot be taken and the true para- 
meters of the model cannot be known.7 Nonetheless, cer­
tain tests can be performed on the sample data which are 
useful in indicating that an assumption has been violated. 
However, emphasis must be given to the fact that these 
tests cannot be conclusive in verifying the assumptions.
The testable assumptions which are crucial in a 
cross-section model are numbers (4) and (7). Number CM-) 
is known as the assumption of homoscedasticity. Assump­
tion (7) refers to the linear independence of the explan­
atory variables X^. These two assumptions are further 
explained and tested in the following two subsections.
Test for Homoscedasticity
The assumption of homoscedasticity refers to the 
variance of the disturbance term e in the model. Specif­
ically, the model requires that the variance of be con­
stant. Where the variance of ê _ is not constant, the datat
are heteroscedastistic.
The condition of heteroscedasticity may be detected 




et = Y - Y . Specifically, Murphy suggests plotting the
residuals against the estimated values of the endo-
genous variable Y . fl Murphy asserts that " . . .  V-shaped,
egg timer shaped, football shaped distributions, etc.,
indicate that VCe.) is not constant."9t A
Figure 1 shows a plot of e^ against Y  for the 
operating income-manufacturing company model. Since the 
plots do not assume the kind of shape mentioned by Murphy, 
no evidence of heteroscedasticity is obtained. Further, 
the plots do not appear to form any particular shape.
This lack of shape in the plots also supports assumptions 
(2) and (3). That is, the residuals appear to be normally 
distributed with mean zero.
Test for Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity is a common problem in multiple 
regression models and is related to assumption (7). 
Generally, multicollinearity refers to the existence of a 
high degree of correlation among the exogenous variables 
in a multiple regression model. For example, Xj and X 2 
may be highly correlated. The condition can be illustrated 
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The precision of the estimated coefficients
is adversely affected when severe multicollinearity is
present. Murphy describes the problem as follows:
In a multiple regression, the partial 
regression coefficient is supposed to 
provide the partial effect on the en­
dogenous variable due to a unit change 
in .the corresponding predetermined 
variable holding the linear effect of 
all other included variables constant.
However, when multicollinearity occurs, 
each variable in the collinear set may 
be sharing in the explanatory role of 
any and all variables in the set.
Consequently, it is very misleading to 
interpret the partial regression co­
efficient. as the distinct effect of a 
separate, individual variable.10
Since four of the five general hypotheses of this study 
relate directly to the coefficients of the specified 
model, severe multicollinearity would be a particularly 
serious problem.
A model can be statistically tested for the pre­
sence of severe multicollinearity. The test is based on 
the matrix-vector concept of linear dependence. Assump­
tion (7), as mentioned, relates to this concept. Murphy 
describes the assumption as follows:
The meaning of this assumption is that 
no column vector of observations can 
be written as a multiple of any other 
column or as a linear combination of 
any of the other observation vectors.
It is assumed that the predetermined 
variables are independent of each other
1°Ibid., p. 369.
Ill
so that each has a separate, measurable 
effect on the endogenous variable.11
Actually, as noted by Murphy, perfect dependency between
any two column vectors in a model is highly unlikely.12
Such a condition of perfect dependency would mean that
the two exogenous variables involved would be perfectly
correlated.
As mentioned above, multicollinearity involves 
high (not necessarily perfect) correlation among the 
exogenous variables. Mathematically, multicollinearity 
involves near dependency among the column vectors of the 
matrix of the exogenous variables. Viewed in this way, 
the condition might also be described as a near violation 
of assumption (7).
Multicollinearity or near dependency in the 
matrix of the exogenous variables can be detected by 
statistically analyzing the simple correlation coeffic­
ients of the model:
Dependencies among the predetermined 
variables are reflected in the matrix 
of simple correlation coefficients be­
tween all pairs of these variables since 
this matrix is calculated from the sim­
ple moment matrix.13
The matrix of simple correlation coefficients is denoted
R* and Murphy notes that ". . . a  dependency among the set




(X^) would imply that the determinant of R* is zero."11* 
Further, as noted by Murphy, the determinant of R* is one 
C|R* | = 1) when no correlation is present among the 
exogenous variables.15
The matrix of simple correlation coefficients 
for the operating income-manufacturing company model is 
presented in Table 9. Murphy gives a chi-aquare test for 
this matrix for which the null hypothesis is H 0: | R*| = 0
where {r *| is the determinant of R*. The test statistic 
is
X2 = -[T-1-C1/6X2K + 5)] In Cl- | R*| ) 
with KCK-D/2 degrees of freedom.16
TABLE 9
OPERATING INCOME-MANUFACTURING COMPANY MODEL 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT MATRIX
Variable Xi x2 x3 X,
Xi 1.00000 .48256 .14209 -.08591
x2 . 4-8256 1. 00000 .19237 -.11191
x3 .14209 .19237 1.00000 .04930
x., -.08591 -.11191 .04930 1.00000




The determinant of the matrix in Table 9 is .722. 
Based on |R*j = . 722 the calculated x 2 test statistic is 
97.93 with 5(5-l)/2 = 10 degrees of freedom. The critical 
value of x2 10 degrees of freedom from Fisher and
Yates is 2 3.2 09 at the .01 level,of significance and 
29.588 at the .001 level of significance.17 The null hy­
pothesis is thus rejected at the .001 level of significance.
In summary, the assumptions enumerated above were 
apparently satisfied by the operating income-manufacturing 
company model. The methodology of the study supports 
assumption (1). The residual plot given in Figure 1 
supports assumptions (2), (3) and (4). Assumption C5)
Cno autocorrelation) is generally not violated in cross- 
sectional models. Assumption (6) obviously holds (80 > 5). 
Finally, assumption (7) is supported by the chi-square 
test for muIticollinearity.
Summary
The sample data provided by the questionnaire sur­
vey were analyzed in three phases. First, the data were 
analyzed to determine whether the sample should be pooled 
into one group or disaggregated into subsets. Second, the 
five general hypotheses of the study were tested on the two 
multiple regression models developed in the preceding
17Ronald A. Fisher and Frank Yates, Statistical 
Tables for Biological, Agricultural and Medical Research,
6th ed. (New^fork: Hafner Press, 1963 ), pT 4 7.
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chapter. Finally, the operating income-manufacturing com­
pany model was further tested to determine whether certain 
basic assumptions of the general multiple linear regres­
sion model were violated.
The Chow test was used to determine whether the 
sample should be pooled or disaggregated. This is a test 
of equality of coefficients among the subsets of observa­
tions in a given regression model. The test indicated 
that the sample should be disaggregated into manufacturing, 
trading and service company subsets in the operating income 
model while pooling would be appropriate in the net income 
model.
With respect to the first general hypothesis, R 2 
was tested for significance for all eight regression equa­
tions that were generated in the study. A regression equa­
tion was calculated for the pooled data and each of the 
three subsets in both models. The R 2 was statistically 
significant for the pooled data and the manufacturing 
group in the operating income model. Since the Chow test 
indicated that the data should not be pooled in this model, 
the null hypothesis was rejected only for the operating 
income-manufacturing company model.
The four remaining general hypotheses relate to 
the explanatory variables in the multiple regression model. 
These hypotheses were tested by examining the coefficients 
of these variables. Specifically, t tests were performed 
on the coefficients with the null hypothesis H 0: = 0.'
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Considering the results of the Chow test, the null hypo­
thesis was rejected only for Xi and Xi, in the operating 
income-manufacturing company model. These tests suggest 
that there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between operating income and these two ex­
planatory variables: percentage of company stock owned
by the ESOP (Xi) and the percentage of ESOP-covered 
employees who have vested interests in the plan (Xi+).
The third phase of the data testing process 
involved a further testing of the operating income- 
manufacturing company model for validity. That is, 
further tests were performed to determine whether cer­
tain underlying assumptions of the general multiple 
linear regression model may have been violated. An 
analysis of the least squares residuals indicated that 
the assumption of homoscedasticity was not violated.
Then the chi-square test for linear dependency indicated 
that severe multicollinearity was not present in the 
model. The operating income-manufacturing company 
model was, therefore, assumed to be a valid model.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This final chapter summarizes the study and pre­
sents the conclusions that are based on the findings of 
the investigation. The chapter first summarizes the 
details of the investigation which are contained in the 
preceding five chapters. The conclusions of the study 
are then presented. The third section of the chapter 
contains a comparison of the results of this study to 
the results of other relevant studies. Finally, the last 
section of the chapter gives some recommendations for 
future research on the subject of ESOPs.
Summary
An employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is a 
deferred compensation program that qualifies under the 
Internal Revenue Code CIRC) to grant tax benefits to 
corporations and employees of corporations. A corpora­
tion receives a tax benefit by transferring shares of its 
own stock to a trust CESOT) established for the benefit 
of its employees. The trust is not taxed on the receipt 
of the shares nor on dividends paid on the shares. The
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employees are not taxed until distributions from the trust 
are received, and taxation at that time is favorable.
There are three different types of ESOPs. Stock 
bonus plans (SBPs) have been permitted by the IRC for 
many years. Pursuant to an SBP, a corporation makes 
annual, deductible contributions to an ESOT. Since the 
ESOT can distribute employee benefits only in the form 
of employer stock, the trust must convert its assets to 
employer stock at some point prior to distribution un­
less the contributions were made directly in the form of 
employer stock. Leveraged ESOPs were added to the IRC 
in 19 74- by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA). Under a leveraged ESOP, the ESOT obtains a 
bank loan which is generally guaranteed by the corpor­
ation. The proceeds of the loan are used to purchase 
stock from the corporation which then makes annual, 
deductible cash contributions to the ESOT, These cash 
contributions are used by the ESOT to repay the loan. 
Investment credit ESOPs were created by the Tax Reduc­
tion Act of 1975. An investment credit ESOP permits a
corporation to receive an additional 1% to 1 1/2%
investment tax credit if it transfers shares of its own
stock equal in amount to the ESOT.
ESOPs have gained greatly in popularity since 
197 4-. The ESOP Council of America estimates that less 
than 4-00 ESOPs were in operation prior to 1974. By
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1978 "the number exceeded 2,200. Accordingly, the business 
literature has given much attention to this topic since 
1974. This attention has raised many issues which involve 
several academic disciplines.
Since ESOPs are related to tax incentives, the
»
issue of tax policy has been raised. Advocates of ESOP 
tax incentives maintain that ESOPs benefit society by 
increasing business efficiency. This increased efficiency 
is a result of increased productivity of workers who are 
motivated by their participation in ESOPs. However, very 
little empirical evidence is available to support this 
position.
ESOPs involve financial accounting problems 
relative to the balance sheet, income statement and sup­
plemental disclosure. Further, all of the transactions 
of an ESOP are potentially subject to SEC registration.
The most controversial accounting issue relative 
to ESOPs is the reporting of the bank loan which is in­
volved in a leveraged ESOP. Both the AICPA and the SEC 
accounting staff recommend that this debt be reported as 
a liability of the sponsoring corporation. The theory 
supporting this approach is based on the doctrine of sub­
stance over form. That is, the loan is, in reality, 
being made to the corporation since there is no economic 
substance to the ESOT. The opposing view asserts that 
this debt does not generally conform to the accounting 
definition of a liability and should be reported by the
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corporation according to the provisions of Financial 
Accounting Standard No. 5, "Accounting for Contingencies."
An ESOP might also cause a tax allocation problem.
If the contributions to an ESOP exceed the 15% limit* in a 
given year, the excess can be carried forward and deducted 
in a future year. If this situation is viewed as a tax- 
accounting timing difference, a tax benefit would be 
recognized and the deferred tax account would be reduced 
in the year of the excess contribution. However, the 
AICPA recommends that such a carryforward should be 
reported in conformity with APB Opinion No. 11 which 
permits the recognition of a tax benefit only "when 
realization is assured beyond any reasonable doubt."
An ESOP can cause income statement problems 
relative to the measurement of compensation expense, to 
the calculation of earnings per share and to the account­
ing for the additional investment tax credit. Compensation 
expense is recorded when an ESOP contribution is made.
APB Opinion No. 25 requires the compensation expense to 
be based on the fair market value of the shares transferred. 
In the case of a publicly-held corporation, FMV is to be 
based on the quoted market price. If the stock is not 
publicly traded the FMV must be estimated. This estimate 
should conform to the value that is determined for tax 
purposes. The AICPA and SEC accounting staff recommend 
that all common shares held by an ESOT be included in
the EPS calculation. This treatment is inconsistent with
t
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the reporting of the bank loan as a liability on the em­
ployer's balance sheet. However, a similar inconsistency 
is contained in APB Opinion No. 15, which requires con­
vertible bonds to be reported as a debt on the balance 
sheet and as common stock equivalents on the income state­
ment under certain conditions. Finally, the AICPA recom­
mends that companies use the flow-through method in 
accounting for the additional investment tax credit. How­
ever, section lOlCc) of the Revenue Act of 1971 permits 
the use of either the flow-through method or the deferred 
method in accounting for any investment tax credit for 
corporations required to file financial reports with 
federal agencies.
There are no authoritative disclosure rules per­
taining specifically to ESOPs. However, a review of the 
authoritative pronouncements which apply to other types of 
employee benefit plans indicates that the minimum sup­
plemental disclosure pertaining to an ESOP would be as 
follows:
1. A description of the plan and the employee 
groups covered.
2. A statement of accounting policies relevant 
to the ESOP.
3. The value of and number of shares contri­
buted to the ESOP for each period for which 
an income statement is presented.
The following ESOP transactions are potentially sub­
ject to SEC registration:
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1. Creating an interest in the plan for 
a participant.
2. The transfer of stock from the spon­
soring corporation to the ESOT.
3. The distribution of stock to a 
participant.
4. The subsequent sale of ESOT-dis-
tributed stock by a participant.
5. The purchase by the ESOT of employer 
stock from a shareholder of the spon­
soring corporation.
SEC registration will be required for each of the above 
transactions unless (A) the transaction is not within the 
scope of the Securities Acts, or (B) the transaction is 
subject to an exemption contained in the Acts. A trans­
action will not be within the scope of the Securities 
Acts if the facts of the case indicate that no sale of 
a security has taken place. The SEC has generally 
supported application of the "no sale theory" to ESOPs 
where Cl) the participants make no investment decisions,
(2) the trust does not purchase the' stock and (3) no
participant contributions are used to purchase stock.
The two specific exemptions most likely to apply to ESOPs 
are the private placement exemption and the intrastate 
offering exemption. The private placement exemption 
generally requires that the purchaser of securities be 
in a position to obtain and understand all relevant 
information about the issuer. The intrastate offering 
exemption requires that the issuer and the purchaser 
reside in the same state. The consequence of not
122
registering stock contributed to an ESOT, however, is that 
the stock will be restricted in the hands of the distri­
butee. ESOT-distributed stock that is restricted cannot 
be sold by the distributee to anyone other than the ESOT 
for a period of two years after the stock has vested.
Before making an ESOP decision, management should 
evaluate an ESOP in three areas. First, the decision 
should be analyzed financially. Second, the possible 
impact of an ESOP on organizational behavior should be 
considered. Third, an ESOP should be compared with 
other alternative benefit plans.
Management should consider the financial impact 
of an ESOP decision from the point of view of the share­
holder group in existence prior to the implementation of 
such a decision. The impact of an ESOP on a firm's 
cash flow, earnings, net assets and shares outstanding 
will vary depending on the type of ESOP which is con­
sidered. The net effect of adopting a stock bonus plan 
is the same as selling stock to the public and making 
cash contributions to a qualified employee trust, unless 
the SBP motivates the employees to become more produc­
tive. The net effect of a leveraged ESOP is the same 
as obtaining a bank loan directly and making contribu­
tions of stock to an ESOT over the term of the loan. 
However, a leveraged ESOP can be useful in financing 
certain transfers of ownership such as selling all or 
part of a corporation to its employees. Finally, the
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effect of an investment credit ESOP is that the government 
purchases employer stock for the employees. Financially, 
taking the additional tax credit is equivalent to. selling 
stock to the public unless there is no market for the 
stock or the employees are motivated by their stock owner­
ship.
An ESOP may affect organizational behavior by 
motivating employees. The motivation potential of an 
ESOP seems to involve two questions:
1. Are employees motivated by employee 
ownership?
2. Do employees perceive an ownership 
interest flowing from an ESOP?
With respect to the first question, the expectancy 
theory of motivation can be used as the basis for an 
affirmative answer. This general theory of motivation can 
be expressed as follows:
Motivation = CE P)(P ■+■ 0)(V) 
where E + P is the expectation an individual has that in­
creased effort will lead to increased performance, P -*■ 0 
is the expectation that the increased effort will lead to 
some anticipated outcome and V (for valence) is the value 
associated with the anticipated outcome. Employee owner­
ship strengthens the relationship between organizational 
performance and personal reward because the employee,
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as an owner, benefits from corporate profit.1 Thus, the 
employee should place a high valence on the anticipated 
outcome of increased corporate profits. Employee owner­
ship may motivate a workforce, then, where the E -+- P and 
P -*■ 0 expectancies are high and where peer pressure can 
be exerted.
The answer to the second question would seem to 
depend on how the ESOP is used by management. The 
holding of nonvoting stock or other assets by the ESOT 
would probably detract from the motivating effects of an 
ESOP, The same could be said of restrictive vesting 
requirements. Further, the motivation potential of an 
ESOP would also seem to depend heavily on the effective 
communication of the details and implications of the ESOP 
to the employees,
The third area of management evaluation is the com­
parison of an ESOP with the available alternative, benefit 
plans. As an employee benefit plan, an ESOP has both com­
pensation and retirement characteristics. If an ESOP is 
to be used primarily as a compensation plan, it should be 
compared to some type of nonqualified bonus plan. A bonus 
plan pays employees a periodic bonus based on either 
organizational performance or individual performance.
1See Richard J. Long, "The Effects of Employee 
Ownership on Job Attitudes and Organizational Performance: 
An Exploratory Study," Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell 
University, 19 7 7, p. 13.
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This alternative has motivation potential but avoids the 
administrative complexities of a qualified plan. If, on 
the other hand, an ESOP is to be used as a retirement plan, 
it should be compared to either a profit sharing plan or a 
defined benefit plan. These alternatives generally offer 
employees more retirement security through a diversified 
trust fund. A thorough analysis, however, will reveal 
that an ESOP has advantages for both employer and 
employee when compared to these alternative plans.
The primary objective of this study was to provide 
ESOP policy makers with empirical evidence which would be 
useful in the formulation of future ESOP policy. Speci­
fically, the investigation attempted to reveal (A) whether 
any relationship exists between company operating perfor­
mance and ESOPs and (B) the nature of any relationship 
which might be found to exist.
This empirical investigation was carried out in 
three phases. First, an econometric model was formulated 
which could be used to test the general hypotheses of 
the study. Second, the data for the model were collected 
through a questionnaire survey of 1135 potential ESOP 
companies. Third, the data were analyzed and the hypotheses 
were tested by statistically validating the model.
Considering the objectives of the study, the fol­
lowing linear explanatory model was formulated:
Y,— $o £31X1 + ^2X2 t 63X3 + SitXi* + £
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where:
Y Z! company operating performance
- the true coefficients of the model
e = the error term in the model
Xi — percentage of company stock owned by 
the ESOP
x 2 = size (as a percentage of payroll) of 
the prior year contribution to the ESOP
x 3 period of time the ESOP has been in­
existence
X- = percentage of ESOP-covered employees 
who have vested interests in the plan.
Two measures of company operating performance were used as 
separate criterion variables to form two separate models 
when each was regressed against the common set of expla- 
nators. The first criterion variable consisted of the 
ratio of operating profit with depreciation added back to 
sales divided by the like ratio for the industry to which 
the company belongs. The second criterion variable used 
after-tax net income instead of operating income with 
depreciation added back. The second criterion variable 
permits the analysis to be made on an after-tax basis, 
and a comparison of the two models might indicate that 
ESOP tax benefits are more important than the indirect 
effects of increased working capital and employee moti­
vation.
The general hypotheses of the study were as
follows:
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Cl) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the ESOP-related 
variables.
(2) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the percentage of a com­
pany’s stock owned by the ESOP.
(3) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the size of the contri­
bution that has been made to the ESOP.
C1*) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the period of time the 
ESOP has been in existence.
(5) There is no statistically significant 
relationship between company operating 
performance and the percentage of ESOP- 
covered employees who have vested 
interests in the ESOP.
In general, hypothesis (1) pertains to the overall 
explanatory power of the model. Each of the other four 
hypotheses pertains to the significance of an explanatory 
variable in the model. These hypotheses were tested by 
statistically testing the following null hypotheses rela­
tive to the models:
H o : R 2 = 0 
H 0: Bi = 0
Since the sample data represented company activity for the 
year of 19 77, the analysis was cross-sectional in nature.
A questionnaire was sent to 113 6 potential ESOP 
companies on June 16, 1978 with a follow-up mailing on 
July 28, 1978. Of the 1136 companies surveyed, 750 to
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85 0 are estimated to actually be ESOP companies. A total 
of 16 5 usable replies were received resulting in a response 





Total usable responses 165
The sample was partitioned into these subsets to make the 
analysis more useful.
The overall soundness of the data was tested in two 
ways. First, in a test for nonresponse bias, thirty early 
responses were statistically compared to thirty late 
responses. The test gave no evidence of nonresponse bias. 
Second, in a test for reliability, financial data from 
seven questionnaires returned by publicly-held corpora­
tions were checked against information contained in 
Standard and Poors Corporation Records and only rounding 
differences were detected.
The data were analyzed in four phases. First, the 
least squares method was used to estimate the parameters 
of the models. Second, a test was performed to determine 
whether the data should be pooled or disaggregated in the 
models. Third, the general hypotheses of the model were 
tested in conformity with the results of the second test.
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Fourth, appropriate tests were performed relative to the 
underlying assumptions of the general multiple linear 
regression model.
Eight estimating equations were calculated using 
the least squares method. Equations were estimated for 
the pooled data and each of the three subsets in both 
models developed above,
The Chow test was used to determine whether the 
data should be pooled or disaggregated in the models.
This test is a statistical test of equality of coeffic­
ients in identical regression models using different 
data sets. The results of the test indicated that the 
sample data should be disaggregated in the operating 
income model and pooled in the net income model.
The general hypotheses of the study were tested 
by statistically testing H 0: R 2 = 0 and H 0: = 0
on the appropriate estimated equations. In accordance 
with the results of the Chow test, these hypotheses were 
tested on the three subset equations in the operating 
income model and on the pooled data equation in the net 
income model.
Statistically significant relationships were found 
only in the operating income model for the manufacturing 
company subset. For this equation, R 2 was . l^Hl which 
was statistically significant at the .019 level. Two of 
the coefficients were also statistically significant in
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this equation. Bi was a positive .006 which was signif­
icant at the .05 level and Bt* was a positive .004 which 
was significant at the .025 level. These results indicate 
a positive statistically significant relationship between 
pretax operating income and the ESOP for manufacturing 
companies. Further, the significant variables in this 
overall relationship are percentage of company stock owned 
by the ESOP (Xj) and percentage of ESOP-covered employees 
who have vested interests in the plan CXi*), which were 
both positively correlated to the criterion variable.
In the final phase of the data analysis, the 
operating income-manufacturing company model was further 
tested for validity. Two tests were performed to deter­
mine whether certain underlying assumptions of the gen­
eral multiple linear regression model were violated.
An analysis of the least squares residuals indicated that 
the assumption of homoscedasticity was not violated.
Then the chi-square test for linear dependency indicated 
that severe multicollinearity was not present in the model. 
The operating income-manufacturing company model was 
therefore assumed to be statistically valid.
Conclusions
The ESOP literature relevant to the study has 
been reviewed. This review has examined certain important 
ESOP principles and issues. Accordingly, certain conclu­
sions seem evident in this review.
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In the tax area, this investigation has revealed 
that the proper choice of ESOP form is important. Both 
leveraged ESOPs and investment credit ESOPs must be 
qualified under other IRC sections in addition to section 
401. An ESOP that does not comply with these additional 
IRC provisions will not qualify for either leveraging or 
the additional investment tax credit. Perhaps even more 
important is the conclusion that certain ESOPs should not 
be qualified under IRC sections other than section 401. 
That is, the basic SBP form should generally be used 
where leveraging or the additional tax credit is not 
desired. SBPs are subject to fewer restrictions than 
the other two forms and are, therefore, a less compli­
cated and more flexible ESOP mode.
In the area of accounting and financial report­
ing, several observations are apparent. First, the 
accounting practice of reporting the ESOP loan on the 
balance sheet of the sponsoring corporation has eliminated 
the possibility of using a leveraged ESOP as a method of 
off-balance sheet financing. This practice, then, has 
possibly discouraged the use of ESOPs by both large and 
small corporations. Further, the practice of including 
the ESOT-held shares in the calculation of earnings per 
share has possibly discouraged the use of ESOPs by large 
publicly-owned corporations. The review of the securities 
law applications to ESOPs revealed that employee contri­
butions will probably subject an ESOP to SEC registration.
13 2
This problem may discourage non-SEC companies from taking 
the extra 1/2% investment credit that is available in an 
investment credit ESOP if employees make matching con- 
tributions. Finally, the fact that unregistered stock is 
restricted in the hands of an ESOT distributee leads to 
the conclusion that either the stock should be registered 
with the SEC, or the distributee should be granted a put 
option giving him the right to sell the stock back to 
the company.
As to the management aspects of ESOPs, conclusions 
are evident in all three areas of management analysis. 
First, the general financial analysis of the three ESOP 
forms revealed that the desirability of the leveraged 
ESOP appears to be limited to specific transfer-of-owner­
ship situations. This conclusion is ironic, because the 
current popularity of ESOPs is largely the result of the 
19 74- legislation which made the leveraged ESOP possible. 
Indeed, the term "employee stock ownership plan" was not 
generally used until 1974. Nonetheless, the SBP, which 
has been available in the tax law for many years prior to 
ERISA appears to be generally more attractive from a 
financial standpoint than the leveraged ESOP. Second, 
the potential of an ESOP as a motivator depends on how 
it is used. In order to realize the full motivation 
potential of an ESOP, management must be willing to 
convey employee ownership through the ESOP. This 
investigation has revealed the several ways that employee
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ownership can be limited in an ESOP. Stock bonus plan 
ESOTs are permitted to invest in assets other than 
employer stock. All ESOPs are permitted to use nonvoting 
stock. SBPs and leveraged ESOPs can limit employee 
ownership through vesting requirements. These limita­
tions on employee ownership could be expected to impair 
the motivating effects of an ESOP. Third, as an alter­
native to other possible employee benefit plans, ESOPs 
have considerable merit. An ESOP should probably be 
used by a large corporation only as a supplement to 
its conventional pension plan. However, for a small 
company, an ESOP may represent an affordable alternative 
to having no employee retirement benefits beyond social 
security.
Any conclusions to be formed from the results of 
the empirical investigation are subject to the methodology 
and data employed. The method was non-experimental.
The method did not involve pre-test/post-test procedures 
nor did it employ a control group. Since the sample 
included only ESOP companies, it was, in a sense, self 
selected. These limitations preclude any inference of 
causality and also limit the external validity of the 
study..
The conclusions must also be tempered by the 
nature of the findings. Statistically significant 
relationships were indicated by the operating income- 
manufacturing company model. The statistics, however,
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were far from overwhelming. The R 2 was low and the co­
efficients were small. With statistical results such 
as these the possibility of spurious relationships 
must be recognized.
Subject to these limitations, then, the findings 
of this investigation can be contemplated. The results 
of the statistical analysis indicate that ESOPs are 
positively associated with operating profit for manu­
facturing-type companies. This category includes pro­
cessors, fabricators, construction contractors as well 
as conventional manufacturing companies. The signifi­
cant variables in this overall relationship are X l3 per­
centage of company stock owned by the ESOP, and X^, per­
centage of ESOP-covered employees with vested interests 
in the plan.
The findings in favor of manufacturing companies 
are not surprising considering the expectancy theory of 
motivation reviewed in Chapter III. In a manufacturing- 
type company the nature of employee job tasks may 
facilitate the motivating effects of an ESOP. First, 
in a manufacturing-type operation an employee has more 
opportunity to increase his own productivity. For 
example, he can speed up a production process, or he can 
reduce the waste of a raw material. Second, there is 
generally more teamwork involved in a manufacturing-type 
operation. Such an operation normally involves assembly 
lines, work groups and processes that are interdependent.
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In expectancy theory terms, a manufacturing-type employee
would probably have greater E -*■ P and P 0 expectancies.
These observations are supported by the president of
Juice Bowl Products, Inc., a juice canning company, who
made the following statement relative to the effects of
an ESOP on his company:
The opportunity to develop team effort through 
ESOP appears to me to be endless. There is 
no employee who is not in a position to make 
the company better if he is really motivated 
to do so. There is no one, from the bottom 
up, who cannot improve his contribution if he 
is constantly on the lookout for opportunities 
. . . Downtime on a high speed production 
line is no longer a chance for an extra 
break. Instead, it is lost earnings which 
affects everyone's investment.2
The two explanatory variables that were statisti­
cally significant in the operating income-manufacturing 
company model can also be related to the ESOP motivation 
theory developed in Chapter III. The reader should note 
that the percentage of company stock owned by the ESOP 
(Xi) included only common stock. Accordingly, the theore 
tical discussion in Chapter III indicated that the use of 
securities other than than common stock might seriously 
impair the motivating effect of an ESOP. This theory may 
explain why Xi was statistically significant and X2 was
2Statement by Jack Grady, U.S. Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Finance, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and 
General Stock Ownership Trusts, Hearings on S. 3241,
ST 322 3 and H .R . 13 8 82 , 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1978 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing (Jffice,
1978) , p. 58.
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not. The size of the prior year ESOP contribution (X2) 
most likely included contributions other than common 
stock. Similarly, the theory in Chapter III indicated 
that the use of restrictive vesting requirements might 
also impair the motivating effect of an ESOP. Therefore, 
the statistical significance of Xt* (percentage of ESOF- 
covered employees who have vested interests in the plan) 
is not surprising.
These findings have several policy making impli­
cations. First, the results would support the general 
encouragement of ESOPs through tax policy. Any increase 
in the productivity of the manufacturing sector of the 
economy would be socially desirable. Second, the use of 
common stock in an ESOP is supported. Third, more liberal 
vesting policies for ESOPs are supported. Any corporate 
management wishing to benefit from increased employee 
motivation by forming an ESOP should consider using only 
common stock which is subject to a liberal vesting schedule. 
Tax policy makers should consider statutory provisions 
which would encourage the use of common stock and liberal 
vesting schedules in ESOPs.
Comparison to Other Studies
There are only two other studies with which to 
compare the results of this study. First, Conte and 
Tannenbaum used a similar approach with a much smaller
sample.3 They tested an econometric model using data 
from twenty companies and the results were similar to 
the results of the operating income-manufacturing com­
pany model in this study. Their analysis indicated 
a statistically significant R2 and statistical signifi­
cance for percentage of company stock owned by workers. 
Aside from sample size, there are four methodological 
differences in the two studies. First, the Conte and 
Tannenbaum sample was not partitioned into subsets. 
Second, their criterion variable consisted of the ratio 
of pretax net income to sales divided by the like ratio 
for the industry to which the company belongs. Third, 
their model did not include a variable for vesting. 
Finally, their statistically significant explanator 
involved only nonmanagerial personnel. Considering 
these methodological differences, then, the results 
of the two studies seem to be fairly consistent.
The study of employee attitudes by Long is only 
remotely comparable to the present study.1* The study 
involved only one company which was directly owned by the 
employees. The results indicated an improvement of both 
employee attitudes and organizational performance as a
3See Michael Conte and Arnold S. Tannenbaum, 
"Employee-Owned Companies: Is the Difference Measurable?" 
Monthly Labor Review, July 1978, pp. 23-28.
^See Richard J. Long, Op. cit.
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result of the change to employee ownership. The two studies 
are consistent in a very general sense in that they both 
produced some positive findings relative to the effects 
of employee ownership. However, they are inconsistent 
in that the Long study involved a service-type company, 
and this study produced no positive findings with respect 
to service-type companies.
Recommendations for Future Research
This study as well as the two studies mentioned 
above all provided limited support in favor of ESOP for­
mation. However, they were all exploratory in nature.
Taken together as a whole, they are far from conclusive 
in their findings. These studies all suffered generally 
from a paucity of available data on this subject. The 
ESOP phenomenon is new, and the total number of ESOP 
companies is small. Further, most of the companies 
presently operating ESOPs have very limited experience 
with these plans.
If the current trend of increased ESOP formation 
continues, more data will be available for future research. 
The increased availability of data will enable future 
researchers to design more sophisticated projects which 
will overcome the weaknesses of these exploratory efforts. 
Before-after approaches can be employed. Longitudinal 
studies can be made. Control group designs will be pos­
sible. These more sophisticated methods will possess
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greater internal and external validity and will make causal 
inference possible. In short, the problem of determining 
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CALipcmniA S tats UnivensiTy, F uLLsrtod_______
BJllemoa CAliFonniA 92634
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING
School of Sunned Administration 
end Eoonomla 
(7I t )  87Q-3S23
June 15, 1978
Dear Sir:
We are conducting a research study of the practical effects 
of employee stock ownership plans fESOPs). We are attempting to 
determine what direct and indirect effects operating ESOPs have 
had on those companies that have adopted them as part of their 
employee benefit programs. Specifically, our research i3 an 
attempt to answer questions such as the following:
1. Does an ESOP have a motivational impact on employees?
2. What direct and indirect effects does an ESOP have on
a company's profit performance?
3. Does the impact of an ESOP increase or diminish with the
passage of time?
U. Are the effects of an ESOP different for different type3
of businesses?
We feel that our findings will be quite useful to corporate 
policymakers with respect to their employee compensation decisions. 
Accordingly, we will send you a sirniar? of our findings if vnu 
will complete the enclosed questionnaire.
Please note that individual company identities and related 
information will be kept confidential, and that our findings will 
be reported only in aggregate form.
This research is being sponsored by the ESCF Council of America 
and California State University, Fullerton. Tour cooperation in 




Randy G. Swad 
lecturer In Accounting
CSUF, as on Squat Opportunity Employer, is co»nni£ted to an A{$inmative Action 
Poiiky which Involved positive action in the. hiring o$ ethnic minorities and 
women.
The CaUforttIa  S tate University A nd Colleges
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CONFIDENTIAL SURVEY OF EMPLOYE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS
INSTRUCTIONS: Please provide the information requested to the best of your
ability. If you are unable (for any reason) to provide certain 
informationf simply leave those items blank and fill-in as much 
of the questionnaire as possible. Where appropriate, you may 
provide reasonably accurate estimates,
  Check here if you wish to receive a s u m m a r y  of our findings and
include your name and address.
COMPANY INFORMATTON!
1. Amount of total assets reported on most recent fiscal year end balance sheet: 
  0 - 5250,000____________________ 510,000,000 - 550,000,000
 $250,000 - $1,000,000 ____over $50,000,000
  $1,000,000 - $10,000,000
2. Type of business:
_ _ _  Manufacturer ____Professional
_ _ _  Processor Wholesaler
 Construction ____Retailer
_____ Service _____ Other
3. What i3 your main product or service?
U. What is the date of your most recent annual financial statements?
5. Data from most recent annual income statement. You may give percentages or 
dollar amounts.
Sales or Service Revenue 1Q03, 5_________ _
Net Income
Operating Income   s _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Depreciation _ _ _  $ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ESOP Contribution   $ ______________ _
6. Did you use LIFO inventory accounting in your most recent annual financial 
statements?
 Yes  No
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7. Was the operating income on your most recent annual Income statement abnormally 
high or low?
_ _ _  Yes High _ No
____ Low
If yes, what caused the abnormality?  _________
If yes, what was the approximate size of the abnormality as a percentage of 
sales?
 $
8. Has there been a significant increase or decrease in the level of your 
operating income since you initiated your ESOP?
Yes _ _ _  Increase ____No
_ _ _  Decrease
If yes, what was the approximate size of the increase or decrease (for 
example, 5$> increase):
H Increase % Decrease
If yes, do you feel that this was related to the ESOP?
Yes __^  No
PLAN INFORMATION
1. What percentage of your company's common stock is held by the ESOP trust? 
 $
2. What percentage of your company's coronon stock is held in trust for nonmanaaerial 
employees?
J-
3. What was the size of your ESOP contribution as a percentage of your ESCP-covered 
payroll:
A) For the most recent year? %
B) For the previous year? £
1* Row long had your ESOP been in existence as of the date of your most recent 
financial statements?
5. What percentage of the ESOP-cwned stock had been vested as of the date of your 
most recent financial statements?
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6. What percentage of your ESOP-covered employees had vested interests in the plan 
as of the date of your mo3t recent financial statements?
 $
7. In your opinion, have the details of the ESOP been adequately communicated to 
your employees?'
 Yes _ _  No
S. Do the ESOP-covered employees vote the shares credited to their accounts 
in the trust?
 Yes  No
9. Has the market value of your ESOP-ovmed stock changed since the inception of 
the ESOP?
____ Increase _ _ _  Decrease  No change
Percentage increase or decrease
EMPLOYES INFORMATION
1. What is the approximate average age of your ESOP-covered employees? _________
2. Have you been able to detect any change in the following since the inception 
of your ESOP?
A) Annual employee turnover! _ _ _  Increase  Decrease _____ No change
Percentage increase or decrease %
B) Annual employee absenteeism! Increase _____ Decrease _ _ _  No change
Percentage increase or decrease £
C) Annual dollar loss from employee theft or waste:
_____ Increase  Decrease ____ No change
Percentage increase or decrease £
D) Employee productivity (output):
_ _ _  Increase Decrease  No change
Percentage increase or decrease %
3- Were any changes indicated above related, in your opinion, to the ESOP?
 <A)  (B)  (C)  (D)
4
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